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PROCEDURAL CHECKS: HOW THE
CONSTITUTION (AND CONGRESS)
CONTROL THE POWER OF THE
THREE BRANCHES
TODD DAVID PETSERSON∗
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court’s separation-of-powers cases present a
number of problems for scholars. The most obvious problem is the
absence of a consistent methodology. The Court’s opinions appear to
wander somewhat aimlessly, without a coherent approach to the
structural Constitution.1 At times, the Court uses a formal and textual
analysis hostile to legislative innovations dealing with the structure
and powers of the branches.2 At other times, the Court relies on a
more functional balancing analysis that welcomes Congress’s
legislative creativity about power distribution.3
One finds additional inconsistencies in the way the Court has
treated the different branches, especially when it comes to statutes
that expand the powers of a particular branch. The Court rigorously
polices limitations on the powers of the federal courts,4 and becomes
even stricter when the question involves a statutory expansion of
Congress’s authority.5 The Court has found it difficult, however, to
develop an effective approach to limiting the statutory expansion of
presidential power, particularly when expanded through delegations
of quasi-legislative power.6 As a result, many scholars criticize the

Copyright © 2017 Todd David Peterson.
*Professor of Law, The George Washington University Law School.
1. See, e.g., Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L.
REV. 1513, 1517 (1991). The structural Constitution refers to the provisions that ordain and
establish the powers of the three branches, particularly Articles I, II, and III.
2. See infra text accompanying notes 63–66.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 53–56.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 57–59.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 48–54.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 84–93.
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Court’s separation of powers cases for unduly limiting Congress’s
ability to redress the shift in power to the executive branch that
accompanied the expansion of the administrative state.7 In these
cases, the Court hurts its own cause because explanations for why
Congress may not augment its own authority have tended to be
superficially textual and overly formalistic.8
Although the Court does not explain itself well, it nevertheless
captures some important truths about how the Constitution protects
against the arbitrary exercise of federal power. The Court’s case law
on statutory expansions of judicial and legislative power recognizes
important procedural checks on the way that power is exercised. By
requiring that judicial power be exercised only in the context of a
litigated case or controversy, the Court gives effect to the framers’
approach to preventing the arbitrary exercise of power by judges who
are largely immune from inter-branch checks on their authority.9
Similarly, cases limiting the power of Congress to expand its own
authority require that any congressional exercise of substantive power
be exercised only through the mechanism of the Bicameralism and
Presentment Clause, that is, passed by both Houses of Congress and
sent to the President for his signature or veto.10 Such a procedural
limitation on the exercise of congressional power ensures that the
framers’ checks on the arbitrary exercise of legislative power may not
be circumvented through the imaginative assignment of power to less
than the entire Congress.
The only problem with these cases is that the Court has not been
able to find an analogous comprehensive constitutional procedural
check on the executive branch. There simply is no Article II analogue
to the case or controversy requirement of Article III or the
bicameralism and presentment requirement of Article I.11 The Court
has mostly been reduced to defining the limitations on statutory
enlargement of executive power by defining what it is not—legislative
and judicial power. As the toothless non-delegation doctrine

7. See, e.g., E. Donald Elliott, Why Our Separation of Powers Jurisprudence is so
Abysmal, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 506, 511 (1989); Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional
Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Questions–A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV.
488, 489 (1987) (arguing that, to permit the President fully to oversee administrative discretion
is to allow the President to assume the legislative, executive, and judicial powers).
8. See infra text accompanying notes 135–146.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 105–134.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 147–156.
11. See infra Part II.C.1.
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demonstrates, however, this approach has not proved to be an
effective check on the enlargement of executive power.12 As a result,
the cases concerning statutory expansions of power look decidedly
unbalanced, with significant procedural checks on the exercise of
judicial and congressional power, but no comprehensive procedural
checks on executive power.
As a practical matter, this imbalance is more apparent than real,
and it certainly does not warrant rethinking the procedural checks on
the judicial and legislative branches. First, when the Court finds an
applicable procedural check on the executive branch, it has not
hesitated to enforce it, as it did in striking down the line item veto.13
Second, and more importantly, Congress has stepped in to fill the gap
by adopting the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) and
numerous other statutes that effectively create the same kinds of
procedural checks on the exercise of power by the executive branch
that the case or controversy and bicameralism and presentment
requirements impose on the judicial and legislative branches.14 By
requiring the executive branch to make and implement its policy
decisions through a set of procedures designed to minimize the
chances for arbitrary decision-making and abuses of authority,
Congress and the courts (through the judicial review that is
authorized by the APA) have corrected the imbalance in the
constitutionally imposed procedural checks on the exercise of federal
power. If anything, as a policy matter, Congress may have gone too far
in imposing procedural checks that have impaired the ability of the
executive branch to implement its statutory mandates effectively.15

12. See infra notes 157–186 and accompanying text.
13. See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 421 (1998). “The law establishes a new
mechanism which gives the President the sole ability to hurt a group that is a visible target, in
order to disfavor the group or to extract further concessions from Congress. The law is the
functional equivalent of a line item veto and enhances the President’s powers beyond what the
Framers would have endorsed.” Id. at 451.
14. See infra text at notes 195–210.
15. See, e.g., 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 301, 442 (2002);
see also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of the Judiciary in Implementing an Agency Theory of
Government, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1239, 1263–65 (1989) (“By transferring vast power to agencies
subservient to Congress and unfettered by substantive statutory standards, each member of
Congress was well-positioned to become a feudal lord. Moreover, while Congress could take
credit for addressing a problem by creating an agency to regulate that area, a legislator could
enhance the credibility of promises of favorable agency treatment to constituents by referring to
Congress’s power to veto an agency action or to remove the agency head.”); Patricia Wald, The
Contribution of the D.C. Circuit to Administrative Law, 40 ADMIN. L. REV. 507, 528 (1988);
Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Heightened Scrutiny of the Fourth Branch: Separation of
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Three significant normative consequences flow from this
understanding of the importance of the APA in redressing the
imbalance in the Court’s separation of powers case law. First, it means
that both scholars and the courts should be sensitive to the role of the
APA and numerous other procedural statutes as an executive-branch
analogue to the case or controversy and bicameralism and
presentment requirements. Second, there is little reason to reconsider
the Court’s imposition of procedural checks on Congress and the
federal courts simply because the Court cannot find and implement a
comprehensive constitutional analog for the executive branch.
Congress has effectively created analogous procedural checks through
the APA and other statutes regulating the manner in which the
executive branch enforces the law, and if it remains concerned about
abuses of power by the executive branch, it retains the ability to add
additional procedural checks on executive power. Third, because the
legitimacy of the procedural checks on the courts and Congress
depends in part on Congress’s power to impose similar checks on the
executive branch, the courts should be skeptical of presidential
arguments that such restrictions unconstitutionally impair the ability
of the executive branch to carry out its constitutional functions.
This article proceeds in four parts. In part one, the article lays the
foundation for the rest of the paper by discussing the differing
approaches taken by scholars and the Supreme Court with respect to
the structural Constitution. Some scholars favor formalist approaches
that emphasize strictly enforced lines of division between the
branches, while others prefer a functionalist interpretation that allows
for greater legislative freedom in creating structural innovations as
long as they do not disrupt the balance of power among the branches.
The Court’s apparent wavering between these formalist and
functionalist approaches reflects the Court’s greater suspicion and
greater scrutiny of statutory expansions of authority than of statutory
restrictions on how a branch exercises its power.
In part two, the article looks at cases limiting the statutory
augmentation of a branch’s constitutional power. With respect to the
judicial branch, the case or controversy requirement should be seen as
a procedural check that is the framers’ response to concerns about the
absence of significant inter-branch checks on the authority of federal

Powers and the Requirement of Adequate Reasons for Agency Decisions, 1987 DUKE L.J. 387,
422–25 (1987).
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judges. The cases restricting the statutory enhancement of Congress’s
powers recognize the Bicameralism and Presentment Clause as
creating an analogous procedural check on how Congress exercises
substantive power. This part then examines the Court’s failure to
recognize a similar constitutional check on the exercise of executive
power, the reasons for this failure, and the ways in which Congress
might reinvigorate at least some constitutional protections against the
arbitrary exercise of executive authority.
In part three, the article discusses why the apparent imbalance
between the constitutional checks on the executive as compared with
the legislative and judicial branches is not a cause for significant
concern because of Congress’s power to impose analogous procedural
checks on the executive branch. Finally, in part four, the article
concludes by arguing that the effectiveness of these congressionally
imposed procedural checks has several important implications for the
separation of powers.
I. THE SEPARATION OF POWERS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
The Supreme Court’s separation of powers jurisprudence has
grown substantially over the past thirty years and has created a
chaotic collection of precedents that defies easy organization and
analysis. Scholars have written innumerable law review articles
attempting to sort through the growing number of cases and to
impose order upon the seeming chaos of the Court’s opinions.16 These
articles have explored the Court’s underlying methodology in a way
that the opinions themselves usually fail to address. The Court has not
only failed to enunciate a clear separation of powers methodology, it
has usually failed even to acknowledge the need for such a
methodology.

16. See, e.g., Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118
HARV. L. REV. 915 (2005); M. Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Powers and Branches in Separation of
Powers Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 603 (2001); M. Elizabeth Magill, The Real Separation in
Separation of Powers Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1127 (2000); Paul R. Verkuil, The American
Constitutional Tradition of Shared and Separated Powers: Separation of Powers, the Rule of Law
and the Idea of Independence, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 301 (1989); Harold J. Krent, Separating
the Strands in Separation of Powers Controversies, 74 VA. L. REV. 1253 (1988); Cass R. Sunstein,
Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421 (1987); Thomas O. Sargentich,
The Contemporary Debate about Legislative-Executive Separation of Powers, 72 CORNELL L.
REV. 430 (1987); Strauss, supra note 7.
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A. Scholarly Theory
Scholars have found it as difficult as the Court to agree on a
methodological approach to the separation of powers, but any
discussion of the nature of scholarly disagreement begins with the
distinction between formalism and functionalism. Formalist theory
emphasizes the importance of separation of the branches and rests on
the assumption that executive, legislative, and judicial powers can be
clearly distinguished and cabined in their respective branches of
government.17 Formalists believe the text of the Constitution provides
discernable answers to questions involving the structural constitution,
that those answers are fixed and do not fluctuate over time, and that
they should be based on the drafters’ original intent.18 Thus, formalists
believe “questions of horizontal governmental structure are to be
resolved by reference to a fixed set of rules and not by reference to
some purpose of those rules.”19
By contrast, functionalist theory emphasizes the importance of
checks and balances and of preserving the balance between the
branches.20 Functionalists believe that the text of the structural
Constitution is indeterminate and that it rarely provides clear answers
to difficult questions involving the separation of powers.21 Under a
functionalist approach, a statute is constitutional “as long as the
policies underlying the original structure are satisfied.”22 For
functionalists, the fluidity of the theory is its strength, and it acts as an
antidote to the rigidity of formalism, which “tends to straitjacket the
government’s ability to respond to new needs in creative ways, even if
those ways pose no threat to whatever might be posited as the basis
purposes of the constitutional structure.”23 A functional approach

17. See John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 HARV. L.
REV. 1939, 1958–61 (2011).
18. Id.; see also MARTIN H. REDISH, THE CONSTITUTION AS POLITICAL STRUCTURE 6–10
(1995); Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1513,
1523 (1991); Gary Lawson, Territorial Governments and the Limits of Formalism, 78 CAL. L.
REV. 853, 859–60 (1990).
19. M. Elizabeth Magill, The Real Separation in Separation of Powers Law, 86 VA. L. REV.
1127, 1138 (2000).
20. Manning, supra note 17, at 1952; see also Harold H. Bruff, The Incompatibility
Principle, 59 ADMIN L. REV. 225, 226 (2007); Sargentich, supra note 16, at 433.
21. Manning, supra note 17, at 1952; see also Peter Strauss, The Place of Agencies in
Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 597 (1984).
22. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Comment: Dueling Sovereignties: U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v.
Thornton, 109 HARV. L. REV. 78, 93–94 (1995).
23. Brown, supra note 1, at 1526.
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typically involves some form of balancing test to ensure that the
equilibrium of power is maintained.24
Finally, it is worth noting a third approach, championed by John
Manning, which rejects the notion that the Constitution contains any
“freestanding separation of powers doctrine.”25 Manning emphasizes
that the Constitution contains no separation of powers clause, but
instead is a collection of disparate structural requirements, some
specific and some general, which must be read in historical context
and each interpreted separately.26 Under Manning’s approach, it is
difficult to give the kind of weight formalists insist on giving to very
general terms like legislative, executive, and judicial power, but crucial
to give effect to more specific clauses such as the Bicameralism and
Presentment Clause, the Appointments Clause, and the Impeachment
Clauses.27 As will be developed in Part II, this article’s emphasis on
the importance of procedural checks to the framers’ vision of the
separation of powers partakes more of Manning’s approach than of
either strict formalism or the more permissive functionalist
approach.28
B. The Supreme Court and The Separation of Powers
For the purpose of briefly discussing how the Supreme Court has
addressed separation of powers issues, it is useful to divide the cases
into three categories: (1) cases that deal with the inherent power of
the branches, neither expanded nor restricted by statute; (2) cases that
concern statutes that purport to restrict the inherent power of a
branch, and (3) cases that seek to augment the inherent power of a
branch. As Justice Jackson’s well-known concurring opinion in
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Company v. Sawyer explains, issues of
constitutional power depend on whether a branch is acting on the
24. Manning, supra note 17, at 1951. Eric Posner has effectively challenged the idea that
courts can effectively apply a balancing analysis to the power of the branches. See Eric A.
Posner, Balance-of-Powers Arguments and the Structural Constitution, 2–5 (Chi. Inst. for Law &
Econ., Working Paper No. 622, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers
.cfmabstractid = 2178725.
25. Manning, supra note 17, at 1950.
26. Id. at 1947–50.
27. Id. at 1945.
28. For the purposes of this discussion, the article does not address theories that the
Supreme Court should leave separation of powers disputes to be negotiated by the branches and
not adjudicated by the courts. See JESSE CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL
POLITICAL PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME
COURT 260 (1980); Aziz Z. Huq, The Negotiated Structural Constitution, 114 COLUM. L. REV.
1595 (2014).
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basis of its own inherent power or with a statutory augmentation of
that power or with a statutory restriction on that power.29
For example, the inherent power category includes those cases
involving the inherent power of the branches without statutory
augmentation or restriction. Cases involving the inherent power of the
executive branch include In re Neagle,30 In Re Debs,31 and
Youngstown.32 In Neagle, the Court held that the President has
inherent power to protect officials of the federal government without
the need for statutory augmentation.33 In Debs, the Court held that
the President had inherent power to seek an injunction to stop a
railroad strike that threatened to halt transportation of the United
States mail.34 Sixty years later, in Youngstown, the Court rejected the
President’s assertion that he had inherent authority to seize the
nation’s steel mills when a steel strike threatened to halt steel
production necessary to support the Korean war effort.35 Inherent
congressional power includes both express powers, such as the
authority to legislate concerning the subjects listed in Article I, § 8 of
the Constitution, and the implied powers that flow from express
authority, such as the power to subpoena witnesses and documents36
and the power to imprison for contempt of Congress those who refuse
to respond to congressional subpoena.37 Similarly, the inherent power
of the federal courts includes the power of judicial review,38 the power
to initiate prosecutions for criminal contempt of court,39 and the
power to make federal common law in order to resolve disputes
between two states.40
In these types of cases, the Court has tended to proceed from the
constitutional text and ask what powers must necessarily be inferred

29. 343 U.S. 579, 635–38 (1952) (Jackson J., concurring). Of course, Justice Jackson was
referring only to the power of the executive branch, but the concept can easily be applied to all
of the branches.
30. 135 U.S. 1 (1890).
31. 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
32. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
33. 135 U.S. at 67.
34. 158 U.S. at 600.
35. 343 U.S. at 585.
36. See McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 161 (1927).
37. Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521, 536–37 (1916); Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6
Wheat.) 204, 227–28 (1821).
38. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”).
39. Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S. A., 481 U.S. 787, 793 (1987).
40. See Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938).
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from textual powers. Thus, Congress has the express textual power to
legislate, and the implied power to compel testimony because the
latter power is necessary for the effective implementation of the
former power.41 The Court has most successfully drawn the
boundaries between the inherent powers of the branches by
determining where the general powers of one branch run into the
more specific powers of another branch. Justice Jackson’s famous
Youngstown concurrence persuasively argues that the President’s
commander-in-chief power did not include the power to seize steel
mills to halt a strike that threatened wartime weapons construction
because the President’s power yielded to the more specific power of
Congress to raise and support armies.42 Justice Jackson’s opinion is far
more persuasive than Justice Black’s opinion for the Court, which
rested on the simplistic assertion that the President’s commander-inchief power had to yield to Congress’s far more general power to
legislate.43
The second category of cases deals with Congress’s power to
restrict the inherent authority of each of the branches through
statutory limitations. For example, Congress may restrict the
President’s inherent authority to remove executive branch officers,44
or it may attempt to limit the power of the courts by restricting
federal jurisdiction as it did in Ex parte McCardle45 and United States
v. Klein,46 or by overturning the judgments of the federal courts in
specific cases.47 Not surprisingly, there are no cases involving
legislative attempts to restrict the inherent power of Congress.
The Court tends to resolve statutory restriction cases by balancing
Congress’s need to legislate in order to solve a particular problem
against the legislation’s impact on the branches ability to perform its
41. See McGrain, 273 U.S. at 161.
42. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 643 (Jackson, J.
concurring).
43. See id. at 586–588.
44. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 696 (1988); Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295
U.S. 602, 629 (1935).
45. See 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 513 (1869) (holding that, while “the appellate powers of this
court are not given by the judicial act, but are given by the Constitution,” they are, nevertheless,
“limited and regulated by that act”).
46. See 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 147 (1872) (“It is of vital importance that these powers be
kept distinct.”).
47. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 227 (1995) (“It is the obligation of the
last court in the hierarchy that rules on the case to give effect to Congress’s latest enactment,
even when that has the effect of overturning the judgment of an inferior court, since each court,
at every level, must ‘decide according to existing laws.’”).
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inherent constitutional functions. For example, in Nixon v.
Administrator of General Services,48 the Court reviewed a statute that
restricted the ability of the executive branch to maintain the
confidentiality of presidential documents. The Court stated that, in
determining whether the statute “disrupts the proper balance
between the coordinate branches, the proper inquiry focuses on the
extent to which it prevents the Executive Branch from accomplishing
its constitutionally assigned functions. Only where the potential for
disruption is present must we then determine whether that impact is
justified by an overriding need to promote objectives within the
constitutional authority of Congress.”49
The balancing approach taken by the Court in cases involving
legislative restrictions on inherent constitutional authority tends to
conform to a functionalist approach to constitutional interpretation.
Thus, the Court has been relatively accepting of statutory limitations
on inherent constitutional power and has employed a balancing test
that eschews the creation of strict lines of demarcation between the
branches—permitting the modification of a branch’s constitutional
authority on a case-by-case basis.
Notwithstanding the Court’s permissive, functional approach to
most statutory restrictions on presidential power, recent Presidents,
particularly George W. Bush, have relied on a strongly formalist
theory to make controversial claims of presidential immunity from
many statutory restrictions. Using a strongly formalist theory of
independent executive power, President Bush issued more than a
thousand signing statements in which he claimed that he was not
obligated to obey statutory provisions that interfered with the
President’s ability to control the executive branch.50 In a compilation
assembled by Professors Neil Kinkopf and Peter Shane, the authors
found that President Bush had issued 1070 signing statements in
which he had objected to the unconstitutionality of one or more
provisions of a statute, of which 380 objections were based on the

48. 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
49. Id. at 443 (citations omitted).
50. See CHARLIE SAVAGE, TAKEOVER: THE RETURN OF THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY
AND THE SUBVERSION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 228 (2008); Sofía E. Biller, Flooded by the
Lowest Ebb: Congressional Responses to Presidential Signing Statements and Executive Hostility
to the Operation of Checks and Balances, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1067 (2008); Neil Kinkopf, Signing
Statements and Statutory Interpretation in the Bush Administration, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS.
J. 307 (2007−2008); Peter M. Shane, Presidential Signing Statements and the Rule of Law as an
Unstructured Institution, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 231 (2007–2008).
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claim that the provision interfered with the President’s authority to
direct the executive branch under a unitary executive theory.51 As will
be discussed later, Congress’s strong authority to impose procedural
checks on the President and the executive branch makes these
presidential assertions of power highly suspect.52
The Court has been much more skeptical of statutory expansions
of a branch’s inherent constitutional power and has been particularly
strict with respect to Congress’s efforts to expand its own powers.
Thus, the Court has struck down Congress’s attempt to give itself a
legislative veto of executive branch action,53 Congress’s attempt to
vest itself with the power to appoint members of the Federal Election
Commission,54 Congress’s attempt to grant the Comptroller General,
a legislative officer, executive authority over certain aspects of the
budget process,55 and Congress’s attempt to place its own members on
a board with control over Washington area airports.56 The Court has
also overturned legislation that enlarged the power of the judicial
branch, including a statute it interpreted to expand the original
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court,57 a statute that required the Court
to give extra judicial advice to Congress and the Secretary of War on
pension applications,58 and a statute that gave the federal courts
jurisdiction over matters that do not involve a justiciable case or
controversy.59 Finally, the Court has occasionally rejected attempts by
Congress to expand the President’s inherent constitutional power,
such as by granting him a form of line item veto60 and, at least in
certain cases, granting the executive branch quasi-legislative authority
without sufficiently clear and intelligible guidelines as to how to
exercise it.61 In these cases, the Court has taken a much more
51. Neil J. Kinkopf & Peter M. Shane, Signed Under Protest: A Database of Presidential
Signing Statements, 2001-2009 (Version 2.0), SSRN Paper No. 1748474 (2011).
52. See infra text accompanying note 235.
53. I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 928 (1983).
54. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 143–44 (1976).
55. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 736 (1986).
56. Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501
U.S. 252, 277 (1991).
57. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
58. Case of Hayburn, 2 U.S. 408, 410 n.* (1792) (“Neither the legislative nor the executive
branches can constitutionally assign to the judicial any duties, but such as are properly judicial,
and to be performed in a judicial manner.”).
59. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992).
60. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 449 (1998).
61. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 551 (1935) (“Those
who act under [constitutional] grants are not at liberty to transcend the imposed limits because
they believe that more or different power is necessary.”). Id. at 528–29; Pan. Ref. Co. v. Ryan,
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formalistic approach to the constitutional separation of powers.
Instead of balancing the impact on separation of powers values
against the need for legislation, the Court has rigidly focused on what
it perceived to be the clear textual limitations on Congress’s ability to
statutorily augment the power of a particular branch.
Notwithstanding the complaints of some scholars about the
muddled state of the Court’s separation of power’s jurisprudence,62
one can explain the differences in the Court’s approach by examining
the issues presented by different separation of powers cases. The
Court is much more likely to be flexible and functionalist in its
approach when the issue is whether a statute inappropriately restricts
the power of a particular branch and thus prevents it from
accomplishing its inherent constitutional function.63 It is much more
rigid and formalist when a statute purports to expand the power of a
particular branch and thus risks aggrandizing a branch with power
that might be subject to abuse.64 This is appropriate given the risks
inherent in granting a branch too much power.
There are several potential objections to this analysis of the cases.
First, one could argue that there is no real difference between a
statute that aggrandizes the power of a branch and a statute that
purports to restrict the power of a branch since all power is relative.
By restricting the power of one branch, Congress necessarily increases
the power of the other branches and, therefore, might be said to
create the risk that power may be abused just as easily as when a
statute grants power directly to a particular branch. While it is true
that a substantial restriction on the power of one branch might so
unbalance the relative powers of the branches that it could create the
risk of an abuse of authority, such a result is not nearly as likely as it is

295 U.S. 330, 388 (1935).
62. See, e.g., 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 121 (2000);
Brown, supra note 1, at 1517 (“Unanimity among constitutional scholars is all but unheard of.
Perhaps when achieved it should be celebrated. But one point on which the literature has
spoken virtually in unison is no cause for celebration: the Supreme Court’s treatment of the
constitutional separation of powers is an incoherent muddle.”).
63. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 696 (1988) (explaining that judicial exercise of the
power to appoint is not in any way inconsistent as a functional matter with the courts’ exercise
of their Article III powers).
64. See I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983) (“With all the obvious flaws of delay,
untidiness, and potential for abuse, we have not yet found a better way to preserve freedom
than by making the exercise of power subject to the carefully crafted restraints spelled out in the
Constitution.”).
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when Congress statutorily augments the power of one of the
branches.
This point is neatly illustrated by Morrison, where the Court
upheld the independent counsel provisions of the Ethics in
Government Act.65 Justice Scalia argued in his dissent that the Act
deeply wounded the president “by substantially reducing the
President’s ability to protect himself and his staff” and that in doing
so, it greatly increased the power of Congress.66 Yet the outcome of
the investigation of Ted Olson that gave rise to the Supreme Court
decision in Morrison itself illustrates the substantial difference
between a statute that restricts the authority of a branch and one that
aggrandizes a branch by the direct augmentation of the branch’s
power. Attorney General Edwin Meese initiated the independent
counsel investigation of Olson at the behest of the House Judiciary
Committee, which claimed that Olson had lied in testifying before the
Committee. It was quite clear that the judiciary committee sought the
indictment and prosecution of Olson.67 If the Ethics in Government
Act had granted to Congress the power to appoint a prosecutor and
supervise the prosecutor’s investigation, there is little doubt that
Olson would have been indicted and brought to trial for perjury. As it
turned out, however, although the independent counsel’s investigation
stretched over an unusually long period of time, Olson was not
ultimately indicted. As a result, he not only avoided the trauma of a
criminal trial, but he was also able to obtain reimbursement for
almost $1.5 million in attorneys’ fees.68
The greater danger of a direct aggrandizement of Congress as
opposed to a mere limitation on the power of the executive branch to
control a prosecution is evident from this example. Limiting the
control of the President and Attorney General over an independent
counsel creates a loss of accountability and diminishes the ability of
the President to ensure that a prosecutor’s actions are consistent with
the general policies of the Department of Justice. But the
independent counsel remains a separate check upon the will of
Congress to prosecute a particular individual. Granting the
prosecutorial power directly to Congress, however, would have

65. 487 U.S. at 696.
66. Id. at 713 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
67. See Alison Frankel, Ted Olson’s Five Years in Purgatory, AM. LAW., Dec. 1988, at 70.
68. See 28 U.S.C. § 593(f)(1) (2000). This provision expired on June 30, 1999 along with
the rest of the Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1994. 28 U.S.C. § 599.
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removed that check and permitted Congress to carry out a political
vendetta against anyone who incurred the wrath of a particular
committee. Such an aggrandizement of Congress’s authority thus
poses a far greater risk to individual liberty than does a statutory
limitation on the President’s supervisory power.69
For example, in Chadha, the Supreme Court declared that a onehouse legislative veto was inconsistent with the Bicameralism and
Presentment Clauses of the Constitution.70 Chadha involved a
legislative veto of a decision by the Attorney General to suspend the
deportation of an illegal alien. The Court determined that the veto of
the executive branch action was legislative in nature and, as
legislation, was subject to the requirement for bicameral passage and
presentment to the President for his signature or veto.71 The Court’s
approach, as many have noted,72 was extremely formalistic and relied
on the determinacy of text that is not necessarily clear. Moreover, the
Court’s conclusion that the legislative veto of the suspension of
Chadha’s deportation was a legislative act because it “had the purpose
and effect of altering the legal rights, duties and relations of
persons . . . outside the legislative branch,”73 seems dramatically over
broad. That definition of legislative action might sweep within it much
of the delegated authority exercised by the executive branch as well,
including the very suspension of deportation that was at issue in
Chadha.74 The stiff and wooden analysis of the Court is apparent from
the absence of any discussion concerning why Congress’s grant of this
authority to itself created an accumulation of power that threatened
the underlying principles of the structural separation of powers in the
Constitution.
69. The only way to restrict or enlarge that constitutional authority is through the passage
of a duly authorized statute. It is not enough for Congress simply to acquiesce in the exercise of
power by another branch; to expand the branch’s authority beyond that which is given by the
Constitution it is necessary for Congress to adopt a statute. Similarly, a formally adopted statute
is the only way to restrict the authority that a branch would otherwise have under the
Constitution. Congress can neither expand nor restrict the other branches in any manner other
than through the passage of legislation.
70. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cls. 2–3; INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983).
71. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 952–57.
72. See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, Was There a Baby in the Bath Water? A Comment on the
Supreme Court’s Legislative Veto Decision, 1983 DUKE L.J. 789, 790 (1983) (criticizing Chadha);
William B. Gwyn, The Indeterminancy of the Separation of Powers and the Federal Courts, 57
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 474, 476 (1989); E. Donald Elliott, Why Our Separation of Powers
Jurisprudence is so Abysmal, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 506, 511 (1989); Strauss, supra note 7, at
489.
73. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 952.
74. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 214−17 (3d ed. 2000).
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That conclusion does not mean there are no justifications for the
Court’s holding. Scholars have subsequently argued that the result in
Chadha was appropriate,75 and as will be discussed in greater detail
below, this article argues that Chadha can properly be seen as part of
a consistent series of cases attempting to control the abuse of
legislative authority by limiting the procedural mechanism through
which Congress can act substantively.76 At present, it is sufficient to
note that we must at least ask the question whether the grant of a
legislative veto threatened an aggrandizement of legislative power.77
A similar pattern played out in Bowsher v. Synar in which the
Court considered a constitutional challenge to the Balanced Budget
and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (popularly known as the
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act).78 In particular, the Court focused on
the statute’s assignment of certain duties, including ensuring a
balanced budget, to the Comptroller General, the head of the General
Accounting Office and an officer of Congress. The Court concluded
that
by placing the responsibility for execution of the . . . Act in the
hands of an officer who is subject to removal only by itself,
Congress in effect has retained control over the execution of the
Act and has intruded into the executive function. The Constitution
does not permit such intrusion.79

75. See Michael Herz, The Legislative Veto in Times of Political Reversal: Chadha and the
104th Congress, 14 CONST. COMMENT. 319, 319–20 (1997); Stanley C. Brubaker, Slouching
Toward Constitutional Duty: The Legislative Veto and the Delegation of Authority, 1 CONST.
COMMENT. 81, 93–94 (1984).
76. See infra text accompanying notes 139–156.
77. The importance of focusing attention on the proper question to ask is even more
clearly illustrated by Justice White’s dissent in Chadha. 462 U.S. at 970 (White, J., dissenting).
Justice White took a functional approach to the separation of powers and argued that the
legislative veto was “an important if not indispensable political invention that allows the
President and Congress to resolve major constitutional and policy differences, assures the
accountability of independent regulatory agencies, and preserves Congress’ control over
lawmaking.” Id. at 972–73. Significantly, Justice White justified this conclusion by arguing that
the legislative veto did not prevent the executive or judicial branches from carrying out their
constitutionally assigned duties. Id. at 974. The problem with this argument is that it simply
misses the point. The issue in Chadha is not whether the legislative veto provision improperly
restricts the constitutional authority of the executive or judicial branches. Instead, the question
is whether the legislative veto allows Congress to act in an unchecked manner that might be
subject to abuses and arbitrary behavior. Justice White is easily able to argue that there is no
constitutional problem simply by asking the wrong constitutional question and failing to identify
the precise nature of the potential constitutional concern before beginning the analysis of the
constitutional validity of a congressional statute.
78. See generally 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
79. Id. at 734.
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Thus, by describing the Comptroller General’s actions as “executive”
the Court concluded that the statute created an unwarranted
aggrandizement of Congress’s authority.80
The Court has acted in a similarly formalist manner to bar
Congress from expanding its own powers through statutes granting
congressional officers the power to appoint members of the Federal
Election Commission,81 and even a statute authorizing congressional
representation on a board with authority over the Washington, D.C.,
airports.82
In addition, the Court has been equally vigilant with respect to the
expansion of judicial power. The Court has consistently resisted any
effort to enlarge the authority of the courts beyond traditional cases
or controversies, and it has prevented Congress from adding to the
original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.83
Distinguishing between aggrandizement cases and statutory
restriction cases does not, however, resolve all of the inconsistency of
the Supreme Court’s case law. The Court has been far more willing to
allow statutory expansion of the authority of the executive branch
than it has with either the legislative or judicial branches. After some
few initial efforts to limit the delegation of legislative authority to the
executive branch,84 the Court has essentially abandoned any serious
effort to limit the delegation of legislative authority as an

80. Id. at 715. Justice White’s dissent in Chadha again missed the point by asking the
wrong constitutional question. Instead of treating the statute as a possible aggrandizement of
Congress, Justice White again insisted that the “court must ‘focu[s] on the extent to which [such
a limitation] prevents the Executive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned
functions.’” 478 U.S. at 762 (White, J., dissenting) (citing Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433
U.S. 525 (1977)). This approach once again creates a straw man by analyzing the statute as a
restriction on the constitutional power of the Executive Branch instead of as an aggrandizement
of the legislative branch. As a result, it was easy for Justice White to conclude that the statute
“[did] not deprive the President of any power that he would otherwise have or that is essential
to the performance of the duties of his office.” Id. at 763. By asking the wrong question, Justice
White never truly grappled with the most significant issues raised by the statute.
81. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 118 (1976).
82. See Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, 501
U.S. 252, 255 (1991).
83. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, The Repressed Issues of Sentencing: Accountability,
Predictability and Equality in the Era of the Sentencing Commission, 66 GEO. L.J. 975, 1009 n.89
(1988).
84. See, e.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 542 (1935)
(holding the code-making authority delegated in the National Industrial Recovery Act to be
unconstitutional); Pan. Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421 (1935) (“The Congress manifestly is
not permitted to abdicate or to transfer to others the essential legislative functions with which it
is thus vested.”).
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unwarranted aggrandizement of executive power.85 As a result, when
the Court must assess the constitutionality of a congressional
delegation of authority to the President, the Court has been able to
say only that a statute may not grant to the President a power that is
expressly reserved to another branch.86 This approach has proven
tricky when the powers at issue are as amorphous and hard to define
as the “legislative power,” as in the non-delegation doctrine or the
“judicial power,” which is at issue in cases involving Article I courts.87
As Justice Scalia has explained:
The whole theory of lawful congressional “delegation” is not that
Congress is sometimes too busy or too divided and can therefore
assign its responsibility of making law to someone else; but rather
that a certain degree of discretion, and thus of lawmaking, inheres
in most executive or judicial action, and it is up to Congress, by the
relative specificity or generality of its statutory commands, to
determine—up to a point—how small or how large that degree
shall be.88

In spite of numerous scholarly efforts to resuscitate the nondelegation doctrine,89 the Supreme Court has shown no inclination to
revive the non-delegation doctrine as a limitation on Congress’s
power to delegate so-called legislative power to the executive
branch.90 Consequently, some scholars have questioned whether there
is such a thing as a constitutional non-delegation doctrine,91 while
85. See, e.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 425 (1944) (“The Constitution has never
been regarded as denying to the Congress the necessary resources of flexibility and
practicality . . . to perform its function.”) (citation omitted); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S.
361, 412 (1989) (“[I]n creating the Sentencing Commission-an unusual hybrid in structure and
authority-Congress neither delegated excessive legislative power nor upset the constitutionally
mandated balance of powers among the coordinate Branches.”).
86. For example, Congress could not give the President the power to unilaterally appoint
principal officers of the United States without Senate Confirmation. See Morrison v. Olson, 487
U.S. 654 (1988).
87. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 855 (1986).
88. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 417 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
89. See David Schoenbrod, Politics and the Principle that Elected Legislators Should Make
the Laws, 26 Har. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 239, 245 (2003); DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT
RESPONSIBILITY: HOW CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION (1993);
Symposium, Delegation of Powers to Administrative Agencies, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 295, 295−442
(1987); Peter H. Aranson, Ernest Gellhorn & Glen O. Robinson, A Theory of Legislative
Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 5 (1982).
90. See Whitman vs. Am. Trucking Ass’ns., Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 465 (2001) (reversing a
Court of Appeals decision that invalidated §109 (b) (1) of the Clean Air Act, which requires the
Environmental Protection Agency to set air quality standards that, allowing “an adequate
margin of safety” are “requisite to protect the public health”).
91. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Non Delegation Doctrine,
69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721, 1722 (2002) (“In our view there just is no constitutional nondelegation
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others have suggested that even if there is such a doctrine, we cannot
expect the courts will enforce it.92 Therefore, the Supreme Court has
been unable to impose meaningful restrictions on the statutory
expansion of the President’s powers on the grounds that such
authority is legislative rather than executive, and recent case law
seems to confirm that one cannot expect the Court to change its mind
in the future.93
Similarly, the Court has allowed the delegation of quasi-judicial
power to administrative agencies to resolve what might be considered
cases or controversies.94 Although the limits on Congress’s power to
delegate such quasi-judicial authority have been hotly debated and
remain uncertain,95 it remains clear that Congress has substantial
power to delegate such quasi-judicial authority to the executive
branch. Although the Court made an initial stab at establishing
formalistic rules on the creation of Article I courts,96 the Court clearly
has abandoned that approach for a more functionalist balancing
methodology.97 Any effort to prevent Congress from delegating
significant quasi-judicial authority to the executive branch seems
rule, nor has there ever been.”).
92. See Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 354 (2002)
(“A plethora of scholars agree that, even if the Constitution contains some abstract
nondelegation principle, it is too indefinite and uncertain to form the basis for constitutional
doctrine.”); see also PETER SHANE & HAROLD BRUFF, SEPARATION OF POWERS LAW: CASES
AND MATERIALS 129 (2d ed. 2005).
93. See Whitman, 531 U.S. at 489 (“It seems clear that an executive agency’s exercise of
rulemaking authority pursuant to a valid delegation from Congress is ‘legislative.’”).
94. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 855 (1986)
(“Congress may encourage parties to settle a dispute out of court or resort to arbitration
without impermissible incursions on the separation of powers, Congress may make available a
quasi-judicial mechanism through which willing parties may, at their option, elect to resolve
their differences.”); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 85 (1932) (finding that the Deputy
Commissioner of the United States Employees’ Compensation Commission had the duty to
determine the quasi jurisdictional fact of whether there existed an employer employee
relationship).
95. See, Paul M. Bator, The Constitution as Architecture: Legislative and Administrative
Courts Under Article III, 65 IND. L.J. 233, 237 n.9 (1990); Frank H. Easterbrook, “Success” and
the Judicial Power, 65 IND. L.J. 277, 280–81 (1990); Larry Kramer, The Constitution as
Architecture: A Charette, 65 IND, L.J. 283, 288–89 (1990); Daniel J. Meltzer, Legislative Courts,
Legislative Power and the Constitution, 65 IND. L.J. 291, 292 (1990); David A. Strauss, Article III
Courts and the Constitutional Structure, 65 IND. L.J. 307, 308 (1990).
96. See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 73–76 (1982)
(“[T]o accept appellants’ reasoning, would require that we replace the principles delineated in
our precedents, rooted in history and the Constitution, with a rule of broad legislative discretion
that could effectively eviscerate the constitutional guarantee of an independent Judicial Branch
of the Federal Government.”).
97. See Schor, 478 U.S. at 857 (finding the assignment of quasi-judicial functions to CFTC
to be constitutional).
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doomed to failure. It is simply too difficult to determine the point at
which executive action becomes an exercise of “the judicial power” to
expect the Court to be able to enforce that border effectively. The
functional balancing test adopted by the Court in Schor98 is
sufficiently loose that it allows Congress to delegate quasi-judicial
authority to the executive branch with few substantive limitations.
Unfortunately, the Court seems not to have even appreciated how
the assignment of quasi-judicial and executive powers to one
executive agency could create aggrandizement issues similar to the
ones at issue in the cases involving Congress and the courts. For
example, the Court has utterly failed to distinguish between Article I
courts that exercise no executive authority on the one hand, and
executive branch agencies that clearly perform executive law
enforcement functions as well as the adjudicatory functions of an
Article I court, on the other. Indeed, the Court chose its review of a
statute granting quasi-judicial authority to such an executive branch
agency (the Commodity Futures Trading Commission) as the occasion
to take a more deferential approach to Congressional delegation of
authority than it had previously with respect to the bankruptcy courts,
which are entirely separate from the executive law enforcement
process.99 This failure ignores the potential for abusive uses of power
when the quasi-adjudicative functions delegated to an Article I court
are merged with the executive enforcement functions of a regulatory
agency. Madison in the Federalist No. 47 quoted Montesquieu in
saying that:
When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same
person or body . . . there can be no liberty because apprehensions
may arise lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical
laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner . . . . Were the power
of judging joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the
98. See id. at 851 (stating that factors weighed include: 1) “the extent to which the
‘essential attributes of judicial power’ are reserved to Article III courts,” 2) “the extent to which
the non-Article III forum exercises the range of jurisdiction and powers normally vested only in
Article III courts” 3) “the origins and importance of the right to be adjudicated,” and 4) “the
concerns that drove Congress to depart from the requirements of Article III”).
99. Compare Schor, 478 U.S. at 857 (finding the “limited jurisdiction that the CFTC asserts
over state law claims as a necessary incident to the adjudication of federal claims willingly
submitted by the parties for initial agency adjudication does not contravene separation of
powers principles or Article III”), with N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 87 (“We conclude that 28 U.S.C.
§ 1471 . . . of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978, has impermissibly removed most, if not all, of ‘the
essential attributes of the judicial power’ from the Art. III district court, and has vested those
attributes in a non-Art. III adjunct. Such a grant of jurisdiction cannot be sustained as an
exercise of Congress’ power to create adjuncts to Art. III courts.”).
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subject would be exposed to arbitrary controul, for the judge would
then be the legislator. Were it joined to the executive power, the
judge might behave with all the violence of an oppressor.100

Regulatory agencies to which Congress has assigned both adjudicative
and law enforcement functions are the very definition of such a
combination of authority.
Not only did the Court fail to recognize this in Schor, it looked
right at the aggrandizement issue and missed it when it noted:
Nor does our decision in Bowsher v. Synar . . . require a contrary
result. Unlike Bowsher, this case raises no question of the
aggrandizement of congressional power at the expense of a
coordinate branch. Instead, the separation of powers question
presented in this litigation is whether Congress impermissibly
undermined, without appreciable expansion of its own power, the
role of the Judicial Branch.101

The Court entirely ignored the possibility that the grant of such
adjudicative authority to an executive agency would impermissibly
aggrandize the executive branch.
The vexing question, therefore, is how the Court could reconcile
its cases dealing with the statutory assignment of a quasi-judicial
power to the executive branch with its more restrictive precedents
limiting the statutory augmentation of the judicial and legislative
branches. In this respect, it might help the Court to recall its own
admonition in the Chadha case:
The Constitution sought to divide the delegated powers of the new
federal government into three defined categories, legislative,
executive and judicial, to assure, as nearly as possible, that each
Branch of government would confine itself to its assigned
responsibility. The hydraulic pressure inherent within each of the
separate Branches to exceed the outer limits of its power, even to
accomplish desirable objectives, must be resisted.102

One way to heed this admonition in the case of delegation of
quasi-judicial authority to the executive branch is to require the
separation of the quasi-judicial authority from the power to initiate
enforcement actions and supervise the operations of the General
Counsel who is responsible for the conduct of enforcement litigation.
100. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 at 326 (James Madison) (James Cooke, 1961) (emphasis
added).
101. Schor, 478 U.S. at 856–57.
102. I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983).
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Currently, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission not only
decides cases as an adjudicatory body but also is responsible for the
initiation and conduct of enforcement litigation. A similar pattern
prevails at the Federal Trade Commission, the National Labor
Relations Board, the Securities Exchange Commission, the Federal
Communications Commission, and numerous other executive branch
agencies.
This is not, however, the only model for the delegation of
adjudicative authority to the executive branch. The Occupational
Safety and Health Act is enforced by lawyers in the Department of
Labor, but enforcement cases are adjudicated before the independent
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission. Similarly, the
Federal Mine Safety and Health Act is enforced by Department of
Labor lawyers within the Mine Safety and Health Administration, but
cases are adjudicated before the independent Federal Mine Safety
and Health Review Commission. There is no reason why Congress
could not insist upon this separation of powers within the executive
branch as a means to avoid an unnecessary accumulation of power
within one administrative agency.
This is an area where the unbalanced separation of powers
Supreme Court precedent could be tipped back more towards
equilibrium by Congress. For Congress to do this, however, it must
take seriously the need to identify the delegation of adjudicative
authority to the executive branch as a potential aggrandizement of
executive power and not just a limitation on the power of the federal
courts.
The only significant exception to the Court’s general deference to
congressional expansion of executive branch power is the Court’s line
item veto case, Clinton v. City of New York, where the Court took a
clearly formalistic approach, invalidating a statute that granted the
President the power to cancel certain items of new spending authority
or limited tax benefits within five days of signing a bill into law.103
Clinton is, however, a rare exception in the Court’s separation of
powers jurisprudence where the Court has enforced a procedural
check on the method by which the executive branch exercises its
power.
103. 524 U.S. 417, 447–49 (1998) (“If there is to be a new procedure in which the President
will play a different role in determining the final text of what may ‘become a law,’ such change
must come not by legislation but through the amendment procedures set forth in Article V of
the Constitution.”).
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For the most part, the Court has looked the other way as Congress
continually expands the powers of the executive branch. Because of
this imbalance, many scholars have argued that Congress should be
free to enlarge its own powers as a counterbalance to the increasing
authority of the executive branch.104 As developed further below, such
a response would be a mistake because it would remove a vital
procedural check that the framers intended to place on Congress.
Instead, as discussed in Part III, Congress has the authority to correct
the imbalance by imposing analogous procedural checks on the power
of the executive branch.
II. PROCEDURAL CHECKS ON THE COURTS AND CONGRESS
The constitutional checks imposed on the judicial and legislative
branches flow from the Court’s conclusion that the Constitution limits
the procedural form in which the federal courts and Congress may
exercise their power. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the
federal courts may exercise substantive power only in the context of a
case or controversy. In the case of the legislative branch, the Court has
restricted the exercise of substantive power to the bicameral passage
of legislation and presentment to the President for signature or veto.
These conclusions flow not from a general theory of formalism or
functionalism, but from the specific expectations the framers had for
how the two branches would exercise their substantive powers under
the Constitution.
A. Procedural Checks on the Federal Courts
The framers restricted the Court’s exercise of substantive
authority to the context of an adjudicated case or controversy. The
constitutional history of Article III explains the importance of this
case or controversy requirement as a protection against the abuse of
judicial power. As explained below, the framers depended upon the
case or controversy requirement to quell concerns about the
unchecked power of federal judges.
Although the Constitution expressly grants federal judges tenure
during good behavior,105 many believed that such unchecked power

104. See, e.g., Elliott, supra note 7; Strauss, supra note 7.
105. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judges, both of the supreme and inferior courts, shall
hold their offices during good behaviour, and shall, at stated times, receive for their services, a
compensation, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office.”).
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would lead to abuses of judicial authority.106 A number of critics
argued that the absence of political checks over the federal judiciary
would lead to abuses of authority. For example, the famous antifederalist pseudonym “Brutus,” criticized the new constitution by
arguing that:
They have made the judges independent, in the fullest sense of the
word. There is no power above them to controul [sic] any of their
decisions. There is no authority that can remove them, and they
cannot be controuled [sic] by the laws of the legislature. In short,
they are independent of the people, of the legislature, and of every
power under heaven. Men placed in this situation will generally
soon feel themselves independent of heaven itself.107

The critics of Article III complained both that federal judges would
have too much power and that impeachment was an insufficient
method of controlling that authority. For example, another critic of
ratification, the Federal Farmer, wrote:
It is an observation of an approved writer, that judicial power is of
such a nature, that when we have ascertained and fixed its limits,
with all the caution and precision we can, it will yet be formidable,
somewhat arbitrary and despotic—that is, after all our cares, we
must leave a vast deal to the discretion and interpretation—to the
wisdom, integrity, and politics of the judges—These men, such is
the state even of the best laws, may do wrong, perhaps, in a
thousand cases, sometimes with, and sometimes without design, yet
it may be impracticable to convict them of misconduct.108

Moreover, the opponents of judicial independence argued that the
framers’ concerns about the potential power of the legislature led
them to underestimate the potential for judicial misconduct and abuse
of power. As one opponent noted:
[W]e are more in danger of sowing the seeds of arbitrary
government in this department [the Judiciary] than in any other. In
the unsettled state of things in this country, for several years past, it
is been thought, that our particular legislatures have, sometimes,
106. See Gerhard Casper, The Judiciary Act of 1789 and Judicial Independence, in ORIGINS
FEDERAL JUDICIARY 284−85 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1992) (noting that 10 states
maintained some form of political control over sitting judges and only three states imposed an
unqualified good behavior standard). The protections in Article III contrast sharply with the
state constitutions, none of which provided protection against reduction in salary and many of
which allowed for some provision for removal of judges by the political branches in addition to
impeachment. Id.
107. THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 438, 473 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981).
108. Id. at 315.
OF THE
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departed from the line of strict justice, while the law courts have
shewn a disposition more punctually to keep to it. We are not
sufficiently attentive to the circumstances, that the measures of
popular legislatures naturally settle down in time, and gradually
approach a mild and just medium; while the rigid systems of the
law courts naturally become more severe and arbitrary, if not
carefully tempered and guarded by the constitution, and by laws,
from time to time.109

Some critics became even more dramatic in expressing their fear of
unchecked judicial power:
To conclude—as the Fox in the Fable, wanting to rob a hen-roost,
or do some such like prank, humbly besought admittance and
house room only for his head,—his whole body presently followed
—. So courts more crafty as well as more craving than that
designing animal, have scarce ever gained an inch of power, but
they have stretched it to an ell; and when they have got in but a
finger their whole train has soon followed.110

The Federalist supporters of the Constitution argued that the
procedures imposed on the exercise of judicial power would prevent
abuse. In particular, they relied on three procedural elements of
judicial decision-making to prevent judicial abuse of power: (1) the
case or controversy requirement; (2) the intra-branch check of
appellate review and (3) the right to a jury trial.
1. The Case or Controversy Requirement
The defenders of Article III relied on the case or controversy
requirement because they interpreted it to mean precedent would
control the exercise of discretion by federal judges. Alexander
Hamilton most vigorously expressed this defense of the
Constitutional independence of the courts. Hamilton expressly relied
on the power of precedent as a check on judicial power: “To avoid an
arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that they should
be bound down by strict rules and precedents, which serve to define
and point out their duty in every particular case that comes before
them . . . .”111 Thus, in Hamilton’s famous words, the courts were not
free to exercise their “WILL instead of JUDGMENT,” which would
result in the “substitution of their pleasure to that of the legislative

109. Id. at 316.
110. Id. at 210.
111. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 529 (Alexander Hamilton) (J. Cooke, ed., 1961).
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body.”112 Chief Justice Marshall later echoed that sentiment, while he
was presiding in the trial of Aaron Burr, and asserted that even the
exercise of judicial discretion must not be dictated by the Court’s
“inclination, but to its judgment; and its judgment is to be guided by
sound legal principles.”113
The language of Article III does not unequivocally say that federal
courts may exercise substantive federal judicial power only in the
context of a litigated case and not by prospective rulemaking. Article
III, § 2 simply uses the words “cases” (as in “cases arising under the
laws of the United States”) and “controversies” (as in “controversies
involving citizens of different states”) as the method of describing the
kinds of disputes over which the courts would have jurisdiction. The
language alone does not necessarily imply that substantive
rulemaking was prohibited. Yet that is clearly how the framers
described the powers of the courts and defended Article III against its
antifederalist opponents. Moreover, the framers avoided any grant of
authority to federal judges that might be exercised outside the context
of a case or controversy. Thus, for example, the constitutional
convention rejected a proposal to give judges a role on a council of
revision that would have the power to veto legislation.114
Later justices picked up on the same theme and emphasized that
the judge’s power was limited by the context in which it was exercised.
Justice Cardozo noted “[t]he judge, even when he is free, is still not
wholly free. He is not to innovate at pleasure. He is not a knighterrant, roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or of
goodness. He is to draw his inspiration from consecrated principles.”115
Justice Frankfurter later put this same principle more succinctly: “We
do not sit like a kadi under a tree dispensing justice according to
considerations of individual expediency.”116 As the Supreme Court has
recognized, “No principle is more fundamental to the judiciaries [sic]
proper role in our system of government than the constitutional
limitation of federal-court jurisdiction to actual cases or
controversies.”117
112. Id. at 526.
113. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 35 (Va. Cir. 1807).
114. See MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1789 75, 79
(1937); James T. Barry, III, The Council of Revision and the Limits of Judicial Power, 56 U. CHI.
L. REV. 235, 253−54 (1989).
115. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 141 (1921).
116. Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 11 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
117. Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org. 426 U.S. 26, 37 (1976).
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Almost immediately after the ratification of the Constitution, the
Supreme Court recognized the procedural limitations on the exercise
of judicial power. In Hayburn’s Case, the members of the Court,
sitting as various circuit judges, declined to exercise authority to
review wartime pension claims because they were not “properly
judicial, and to be performed in a judicial manner.”118 Under Chief
Justice John Jay the Supreme Court refused to give President
Washington informal advice on legal issues relating to the neutral
status of the United States in the European War of 1793.119 In Muskrat
v. United States, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that federal judicial
power may only be exercised in the context of a case or controversy,
which the Court defined to be “the claims of litigants brought before
the courts for determination by such regular proceedings as are
established by law or custom for the protection or enforcement of
rights, or the prevention, redress, or punishment of wrongs.”120
Congress may, of course, grant to the courts the power to make
prospective rules in a non-case or controversy context, as long as
those rules are purely procedural. For example, under the Rules
Enabling Act,121 the Supreme Court and all courts established by acts
of Congress “may from time to time prescribe rules for their conduct
of their business,”122 and the Supreme Court “shall have the power to
prescribe general rules of practice and procedure and rules of
evidence for cases in the United States district courts . . . and courts of
appeals.”123 These rules, however, may not “abridge, enlarge or modify
any substantive right.”124 Although the line between substance and
procedure is famously blurry in the context of judicial power,125 it is
clear that Congress could not constitutionally grant to the courts the
power to create clearly substantive rules in prospective form and that
the courts may create such rules only through the procedural
mechanism of a case or a controversy.

118. 2 U.S. 409, 410 n.* (1792).
119. Letter from Chief Justice John Jay and the Associate Justices to President George
Washington (Aug. 8, 1793).
120. 219 U.S. 346, 357 (1911).
121. Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–77 (2012).
122. § 2071(a).
123. § 2072(a).
124. § 2072(b).
125. See, e.g., Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, 518 U.S. 415, 468 (1996) (referring to the
“uncertain area between substance and procedure”).
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2. The Intra-branch Check of Appellate Review
One of the additional benefits of limiting the exercise of judicial
power to the context of cases or controversies is that it allows for
multiple levels of review of a particular case. The trial courts find the
facts and issue initial decisions while the courts of appeals have the
power to review the decisions of the trial courts and the Supreme
Court retains the ultimate power to correct areas of law. Although the
Constitution does not guarantee the right to an appeal,126 it clearly
contemplates an appellate process. Ever since the Judiciary Act of
1789, federal statutes have provided for at least one level of appellate
review.127 Thus, the case or controversy limitation permits the creation
of intra-branch checks on the exercise of judicial power that stand in
the place of inter-branch checks from which the judiciary is largely
protected. In addition, although, in the famous words of Justice
Jackson, the Supreme Court may “be infallible only because we are
final,”128 even the Supreme Court is subject to the limitations of a
multi-tiered judicial system. In Marbury v. Madison,129 the Court
tacitly acknowledged the significance of this multi-tiered system by
declaring that Congress could not statutorily grant original mandamus
jurisdiction to the Supreme Court, which effectively interpreted the
grants of original jurisdiction in Article III to be a ceiling rather than
a floor for Supreme Court jurisdiction. Hence, the Supreme Court is
largely limited to reviewing cases in which the factual record is made
in lower courts, which limits the scope of the Court’s power.
3. The Right to a Jury Trial
Finally, the framers expected that the right to a jury trial would
prevent abuses of judicial power. Hamilton sought to reassure
opponents of the Constitution that the grant of appellate jurisdiction
126. The Supreme Court has described the right of appeal as “not essential to due process,
provided that due process has already been accorded in the tribunal of first instance.” Ohio ex.
rel. Bryant v. Akron Metro. Park Dist. For Summit Cty., 281 U.S. 74, 80 (1930); see also
McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687 (1894) (ruling that appellate review of criminal
convictions is not a requirement of due process of law).
127. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §§ 11, 22, 1 Stat. 73, 84 (stating that Supreme Court
review of “final judgements and decrees in civil actions, and suits in equity in a circuit court,
brought there by original process, or removed there from courts of the several States, or
removed there by appeal from a district court where the matter in dispute exceeds the sum or
value of two thousand dollars”).
128. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
129. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 138 (1803) (“Congress have not power to
give original jurisdiction to the supreme court in other cases than those described in the
constitution.”).
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to the Supreme Court, both as to matters of fact and law, would not be
used to overturn the findings of common law juries.130 Hamilton
argued that appellate jurisdiction over factual issues would extend
only to civil law matters and other cases not tried to a jury. Hamilton
stated that this interpretation
puts it out of all doubt that the supposed abolition of the trial by
jury, by the operation of this provision, is fallacious and untrue. The
legislature of the United States would certainly have full power to
provide that in appeals to the supreme court there should be no
reexamination of facts where they had been tried in the original
causes by juries.131

In any event, the Bill of Rights, which guaranteed the right to a jury
trial, ultimately addressed the Anti-Federalists’ concerns. In suits at
common law where the amount in controversy exceeded $20, the
Seventh Amendment required that “the right of trial by jury shall be
preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined
in any court of the United States than according to rules of the
common law.”132 Thus, the framers guaranteed that the jury would
continue to serve as a significant public check on the fact-finding
power of Article III judges.
Furthermore, the new Congress moved quickly to protect the
jurisdiction of common law juries against the intrusions of equity
courts. The Judiciary Act of 1789 expressly limited equity jurisdiction
in a number of areas to preserve the common law right to a jury
trial.133 In addition, sections 19, 26 and 30 of the Act specifically
circumscribed judicial fact-finding.134 By 1800, the Anti-Federalists’
three principal concerns about preserving the right to jury trials were
addressed: (1) the Constitution guaranteed the basic right to a jury
trial; (2) the Constitution also restricted the courts’ ability to review a
jury’s findings of fact; and (3) statutes expressly restrained the courts’
ability to avoid jury trials by expanding equity jurisdiction. For our
purposes, the key point is that the jury trial could only check judicial
power that was exercised through the procedure of a litigated case or

130. THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 549−51 (Alexander Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed., 1961).
131. Id. at 552.
132. U.S. CONST. amend VII.
133. Section 16 of the Act restated the general common law rule that suits in equity would
not be permitted in any case in which a “plain, adequate and complete remedy may be had at
law.” Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of The Trial Court, Viewed From Above, 22
SYRACUSE L. REV. 635, 637 (1971) (discussing Hamilton’s view of the Judiciary Act).
134. Id.
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controversy and not through the procedure of substantive prospective
rule making.
Therefore, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Constitution to
protect against the abuse of judicial power by limiting its exercise to
the context of a justiciable case or controversy. In that context,
precedent, the internal checks of the multi-level court system, and the
right to a jury trial ensure that the courts will not abuse their
authority.
B. Procedural Checks on the Exercise of Legislative Power
Supreme Court cases that limit Congress’s authority to grant itself
additional statutory powers rely on a similar procedural limitation.
Although the Court has not expressly discussed these restrictions as a
control on the form in which Congress exercises its power, the cases
certainly accommodate such an understanding. When viewed
together, these cases are best read as identifying the bicameralism and
presentment requirements of Article I, § 7 as the legislative analog to
the case or controversy requirement. If Congress wishes to act
substantively to affect the rights and responsibilities of individuals
outside the legislative branch, it may do so only through the bicameral
passage of a bill and presentment to the President for signature or
veto.
In Chadha, while reviewing the constitutionality of a one-house
legislative veto, the Court stated that they must first “establish that
the challenged action . . . is of the kind to which the procedural
requirements of Art. I, § 7 apply. Not every action taken by either
House is subject to the bicameralism and presentment requirements
of Art. I . . . . Whether actions taken by either House are, in law and
fact, an exercise of legislative power depends not on their form but
upon whether they contain matter which is properly to be regarded as
legislative in its character and effect.” 135 The Court then proceeded to
define legislative authority as “action that had the purpose and effect
of altering the legal rights, duties, and relations of persons . . . outside
the legislative branch.”136
As previously noted, many scholars have justly criticized the
Court’s characterization of “legislative” action.137 If the veto of Mr.
135. I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 952 (1983) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
136. Id.
137. See, e.g., Elliott, supra note 7, at 511 (“In paying literal, even slavish, obeisance to the
Framers’ intentions on the specifics of governmental organization and structure, the courts
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Chadha’s deportation suspension was a legislative act then why was
the Attorney General’s suspension of the deportation not also a
legislative act that would have required bicameral passage and
presentment to the President as well? As Professor Lawrence Tribe
has argued, the difficulty with the Court’s definition of legislation
is that the same observations apply with equal validity to nearly all
exercises of delegated authority, whether by a House of Congress
or by an executive department or an administrative agency. Both
through rule-making and through case-by-case adjudication,
exercises of delegated authority change legal rights and privileges
no less than do full-fledged laws.138

The Court might have made a more coherent statement of
constitutional doctrine by using the same language not as a definition
for the terms legislation or legislative act, but rather as the definition
for when Congress acts substantively as opposed to procedurally.
Thus, when Congress acts to alter the “legal rights, duties and
relations of persons outside the legislative branch,” it is exercising
substantive authority under the Constitution. The Court then might
have drawn the conclusion that whenever Congress acts substantively,
it must do so through bicameral passage and presentment to the
President.
Such a characterization would place the Bicameralism and
Presentment Clause on the same footing as the case or controversy
limitation on the exercise of judicial power. Seen in this way, the
Bicameralism and Presentment Clause acts as a procedural check on
Congress by ensuring that whenever it acts substantively, it acts with
the procedural checks and balances that the framers regarded as an
essential protection against legislative abuse of power. Thus, it is not
necessary to define a legislative act; it is sufficient to say that, just as
the courts may exercise their power only in the context of a case or
controversy, Congress may exercise its substantive authority only

violate the deeper, more fundamental spirit of the Framers’ vision that power should be divided
and balanced creatively to prevent misuse.”); Strauss, supra note 7, at 522 (“[T]he repetitive
making of ‘reasonable’ choices by Congress will, over time, erode the independence of the
judiciary or of the President. The argument is that a series of small steps, each reasonable within
its context, provides a means by which Congress may subordinate either or both of these actors.
The changes litigation growth has been working in the judiciary’s capacity to function, and the
resulting spate of proposals to consign new areas to administrative rather than judicial
provenance.”).
138. 1 TRIBE, supra note 62, at 144.
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through the passage of a bill by both the House and Senate and
presentment to the President.139
The same analysis can be applied to the Court’s decision in
Bowsher v. Synar. In Bowsher, the Court concluded “Congress cannot
reserve for itself the power of removal of an officer charged with the
execution of the laws except by impeachment. To permit the
execution of the laws to be vested in an officer answerable only to
Congress would, in practical terms, reserve in Congress control over
the execution of the laws.”140 Because the duties assigned to the
Comptroller General by the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act involved
functions “plainly entailing execution of the law in constitutional
terms” the Court declared the grant of authority to be
unconstitutional.141 Thus, the Court’s decision rests upon the
assumption that “executive” actions can be clearly defined and
distinguished from legislative actions.
The Court did not have to define “execution” of the laws. Instead,
the Court could have viewed Chadha as establishing the principle that
neither Congress nor one of its agents can affect the substantive rights
of anyone outside the legislative branch unless Congress utilizes the
process of bicameral passage and presentment to the President. The
exercise of any such authority by an officer of Congress, like the
Comptroller General, is clearly unconstitutional on the basis of that
principle. The problem is not that the action taken by the
congressional officer is executive, it is rather that Congress is acting to
affect substantive rights without following the procedure the
Constitution requires. Such a rule may be easily applied any time
Congress delegates substantive authority to one of its own.
The Court itself has virtually admitted the futility of attempting to
define congressionally controlled actions as either legislative actions
or execution of the laws. In Metropolitan Washington Airports
Authority v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, the Court
139. Fortunately, it should prove much easier to distinguish substantive from procedural
actions in the context of congressional power than it is in the judicial realm. Private individuals
participate in the actions of litigated cases in the judicial branch, so an action regulating those
cases could be seen as affecting the legal rights of persons outside the judicial branch.
Individuals do not have the same involvement in the legislative arena, so it is much easier to
determine when a legislative action alters the “legal rights, duties and relations of persons
outside the legislative branch.”
140. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726 (1986).
141. Id. at 732–33.
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addressed the constitutionality of a statute that transferred federal
operating control over two airports near the District of Columbia to a
newly created regional authority.142 The statute required the
appointment of a nine-member Board of Review that would consist of
members of Congress serving “in their individual capacities, as
representatives of users of the airports.”143 The Court was not faked
out by the structure and concluded that the Board of Review was “an
agent of Congress.”144
The Court then noted that, as an agent of Congress, the Board
could not exercise executive authority nor could it exercise legislative
authority without complying with the requirements of bicameralism
and presentment.145 Although the Court of Appeals had found the
Board’s authority to be executive in nature, the Court concluded,
We need not agree or disagree with this characterization by the
Court of Appeals to conclude that the Board of Review’s power is
constitutionally impermissible. If the power is executive, the
Constitution does not permit an agent of Congress to exercise it. If
the power is legislative, Congress must exercise it in conformity
with the bicameralism and presentment requirements of Art. I, § 7.
In short, when Congress “[takes] action that ha[s] the purpose and
effect of altering the legal rights, duties, and relations of
persons . . . outside the Legislative Branch,” it must take that
action by the procedures authorized in the Constitution.146

Thus, the Court effectively recognized the futility of trying to define
the terms “legislative” and “executive” in order to determine whether
Congress may grant itself authority to act substantively. In effect, the
Court acknowledged that any substantive action by Congress must be
taken through the procedural mechanism of bicameral passage and
presentment to the President.
As a matter of constitutional text, such a limitation on the exercise
of congressional authority is no less clear and direct than the case or
controversy limitations of Article III. It is true that Article I does not
expressly state that Congress may act substantively only through
bicameral passage and presentment to the President, but neither does
Article III state that the courts may exercise substantive power only

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

501 U.S. 252, 255 (1991).
Id. at 259.
Id.
Id. at 290.
Id. at 276.

PETERSON ISSUE VERSION (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

3/29/2018 1:48 PM

PROCEDURAL CHECKS

241

in the context of a case or controversy. Although Section 8, which
describes the powers of Congress, nowhere states that these powers
may be exercised only through bicameral passage and presentment to
the President, it has always been understood that the requirements of
the preceding section apply to each of the powers set forth in § 8.147
When the framers intended Congress to exercise power in a
manner other than through bicameral passage and presentment to the
President, they explicitly set forth such authority in the Constitution.
Article I, § 2, clause 5 gives the House of Representatives the sole
power to initiate impeachments.148 Article I, § 3, clause 6 gives the
Senate the sole power to try impeachments after the House brings
charges.149 Article II, § 2, clause 2 gives the Senate the power to
approve or disapprove of presidential appointments.150 The same
provision gives the Senate the power to ratify treaties negotiated by
the President.
Recharacterizing the holdings of Chadha, Bowsher, and MWAA as
imposing a procedural check on the manner in which Congress
exercises substantive authority is consistent with the framers intent to
control the potential abuse of power in the branch most responsive to
political passion. The framers clearly recognized the potential abuse
of power that might arise from the highly political nature of the
legislature.151 Madison argued
In a representative republic, where the executive magistracy is
carefully limited both in the extent and the duration of its power,
and where the legislative power is exercised by an assembly, which
is inspired by a supposed influence over the people with an
intrepid confidence in its own strength, which is sufficiently
numerous to feel all the passions which actuate a multitude; yet
not so numerous as to be incapable of pursuing the objects of its
passions, by means by which reason prescribes; it is against the
enterprising ambition of this department, that the people ought to

147. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 952 (1983).
148. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5.
149. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
150. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
151. See Sunstein, supra note 16, at 435 (“[P]rivate groups, whether minorities or (more
likely) majorities, might use governmental authority to oppress others . . . . The separation of
powers and the system of checks and balances were intended to reduce that risk. A faction
might come to dominate one branch, but it was unlikely to acquire power over all three. The
distribution of national powers thus operated to protect minorities from the tyranny of powerful
private groups.”).
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indulge all their jealously and exhaust all their precautions.152

Similarly, during the constitutional debates on the need for a
bicameral legislature, James Wilson argued
Despotism comes on mankind in different shapes. Sometimes in an
Executive, sometimes in a military, one. Is there no danger of a
Legislative despotism? Theory & practice both proclaim it. If the
Legislative authority be not restrained, there can be neither liberty
nor stability; and it can only be restrained by dividing it within
itself, into distinct and independent branches. In a single house
there is no check, but the inadequate one, of the virtue & good
sense of those who compose it.153

Alexander Hamilton opposed a unicameral legislature on the ground
that if the Constitution provided for only one house,
we shall finally accumulate, in a single body, all the most important
prerogatives of sovereignty; and thus entail upon our posterity, one
of the most execrable forms of government that human infatuation
ever contrived. Thus we should create in reality that very tyranny,
which the adversaries of the new constitution either are, or affect
to be solicitous to avert.154

Madison summed up the need for a bicameral legislature by arguing
that
In republican government the legislative authority, necessarily,
predominates. The remedy for this inconveniency is, to divide the
legislature into different branches; and to render them, by different
modes of election and, different principles of action, as little
connected with each other, as the nature of their common
functions, and their common dependence on the society, will
admit.155

The framers expressed a similar concern about the need for a
presidential veto as an essential check on legislative authority.
Hamilton defended the President’s veto by arguing
It establishes a salutary check upon the legislative body calculated
to guard the community against the effects of faction, precipitancy,
or of any impulse unfriendly to the public good, which may
happen to influence a majority of that body. . . The primary
inducement to conferring the power in question upon the

152.
153.
154.
155.

THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 333−34 (James Madison) (J. Cooke ed., 1961).
FARRAND, supra note 114, at 254.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, at 145 (Alexander Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed., 1961).
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 350 (James Madison) (J. Cooke ed., 1961).
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executive is, to enable him to defend himself; the secondary one is
to increase the chances in favor of the community, against the
passing of bad laws, through haste, in-advertence, or design.156

These checks on legislative authority would be subverted if
Congress could affect the rights of those outside the legislative branch
by delegating to itself the statutory authority to act without bicameral
passage and presentment to the President. Just as the courts’ potential
abuse of power is controlled by channeling the exercise of their
authority through the procedural mechanism of a case or controversy,
the Constitution guards against legislative abuse of power by
requiring that any exercise of Congress’s authority be channeled
through the procedural mechanism of bicameral passage and
presentment to the President.
Such a limitation does not prevent Congress from conducting its
own internal operations through another procedural mechanism
whether by action of one house alone, the action of a committee, or
the action of an officer of Congress created by statute for the purpose
of internal management of Congress’s operations. Just as the courts
are free to enact rules of procedure through prospective rulemaking
outside of the context of a case or controversy, Congress is permitted
to regulate its own procedures without regard to the procedural
checks imposed on its substantive authority.
By reconceptualizing the Court’s definition of legislative action as
simply a definition of the line between substantive and procedural
authority, it becomes apparent that the Bicameralism and
Presentment Clause is the legislative analog to the case or controversy
requirement. Substantive action by both the judicial and legislative
branches may be exercised only through the procedural mechanisms
specified in the Constitution, while procedural regulations may
proceed without the need for such strict limitations on the manner in
which power is exercised. These constitutional requirements create
procedural checks that limit the ability of the legislative and judicial
branches to abuse the authority granted to them and protect the
public from the arbitrary exercise of governmental power.
C. Procedural Checks on the Executive Branch
Although the Constitution imposes procedural checks on the
exercise of substantive authority by the judicial and legislative
156. THE FEDERALIST NO. 73, at 495 (Alexander Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed., 1961).
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branches, there is no such comprehensive procedural check with
respect to the executive branch. Unlike Article III, with its case or
controversy requirement and Article I with its Bicameralism and
Presentment Clause, Article II contains nothing to suggest the form in
which the executive branch must exercise all of its power. Article II, §
1, clause 1 states that “the executive Power shall be vested in a
President of the United States of America.”157 Section 2 contains an
enumeration of the specific powers granted to the President, but
relatively few of these specific powers contain any procedural
mechanism for their execution. The power to make treaties is
contingent upon the concurrence of two-thirds of the Senate, and the
power to appoint principal officers of the United States is contingent
upon the advice and consent of the Senate.158 Other than that, the
President is generally limited only by the checks of statutes enacted
by Congress, which may direct him to exercise delegated authority in
a particular manner, because the President is generally required to
“take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”159
The Supreme Court, however, has identified some additional
narrow and specific procedural checks that control the way certain
types of executive powers are exercised. As detailed below, these
checks include procedural safeguards required by the Due Process
Clause, the limitations on how the President may use his veto power,
and the requirement that quasi-judicial authority be subject to judicial
review by an Article III court. Even with these checks, however, the
executive branch is substantially less bound by procedural checks
than the other two branches.
1. Procedural Checks Imposed by the Due Process Clause
When the executive branch takes actions that have the potential
to deprive a person of a property right, including a vested interest in
certain kinds of government benefits, the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment requires that the executive must provide a hearing
and other procedural safeguards before the property right is
affected.160 In Goldberg v. Kelly, the Supreme Court reviewed a claim
brought by a welfare recipient whose benefits were terminated
without the benefit of a hearing before the benefits were

157.
158.
159.
160.

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
See generally 2 PIERCE, supra note 15, at §§ 9.3–9.5.
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terminated.161 The Court determined that welfare benefits “are a
matter of statutory entitlement for persons qualified to receive
them.”162 Thus, for the first time, the Court recognized government
benefits as property that triggered the requirements of the Due
Process Clause.163 These requirements included a pre-termination
hearing that would include “minimum procedural safeguards, adapted
to the particular characteristics of welfare recipients, and to the
limited nature of the controversies to be resolved.”164 After Goldberg,
the Court addressed many similar issues in which the executive
branch was subject to the procedural requirements of the Due Process
Clause.165 For our purposes, it is sufficient to note that the Fifth
Amendment imposes substantial procedural checks on executive
power when the executive threatens to deprive individuals of vested
property rights that include many different kinds of government
entitlements.
2. Procedural Checks on the President’s Veto Power
Notwithstanding the absence of a comprehensive procedural
check on the executive branch, the Constitution does contain certain
procedural checks on the President’s power. In particular, the
President may exercise his veto authority only with respect to an
entire bill, passed by both the House and the Senate. Congress may
not give the President power to veto only part of a bill in the form of
a line-item veto. In Clinton v. City of New York, the Supreme Court
invalidated the Line Item Veto Act,166 which authorized the President
to cancel three types of provisions in newly enacted statutes: “(1) any
dollar amount of discretionary budget authority; (2) any item of new
direct spending; or (3) any limited tax benefit.”167 The Act imposed a
number of strict limitations on how the President was to exercise his
cancellation authority. First, in identifying items for cancellation, the
President was required to consider the legislative history, the
purposes, and other relevant information about the items to be
161. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
162. Id. at 262.
163. See 2 PIERCE, supra note 15, at 571 (“[Goldberg] was the first case in which the Court
applied the Due Process Clause broadly to government benefits that were previously classified
as mere ‘privileges,’ . . . .”).
164. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 267.
165. See generally 2 PIERCE, supra note 15, at §§ 9.3–9.5.
166. 2 U.S.C. § 691 et seq. (1996).
167. § 691(a), invalidated by Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) (invalidating
on the ground that it violated the Presentment Clause of Art. I, §7, cl. 2 of the Constitution).

PETERSON ISSUE VERSION (DO NOT DELETE)

246

3/29/2018 1:48 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[VOL. 13:1

cancelled.168 Second, he was required to determine with respect to
each cancellation that it would “(i) reduce the Federal budget deficit;
(ii) not impair any essential Government functions; and (iii) not harm
the national interest.”169 Finally, the statute required the President to
transmit a special message to Congress notifying it of each
cancellation within five calendar days (excluding Sundays) after the
enactment of the cancelled provision.170 The Act then permitted
Congress to adopt a “disapproval bill” in order to nullify the
President’s proposed cancellations.
The Court concluded that “[i]n both legal and practical effect, the
President has amended two Acts of Congress by repealing a portion
of each . . . . There is no provision in the Constitution that authorizes
the President to enact, to amend, or to repeal statutes.”171 The Court
distinguished between the veto authority authorized by Article I, § 8,
clause 2 and the cancellation authority granted by the Line Item Veto
Act, “The constitutional return takes place before the bill becomes
law; the statutory cancellation occurs after the bill becomes law. The
constitutional return is of the entire bill; the statutory cancellation is
of only a part.”172 The Court viewed these differences with the “single,
finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure” of Article I, §
7.173 The Court expressly distinguished line item veto authority from
delegated discretionary authority to change tariff duties, a power
upheld by the Court in Field v. Clark.174 The Court noted that the
power to alter the tariff was “contingent upon a condition that did not
exist when the Tariff Act was passed,” while the President’s line item
veto authority “necessarily was based on the same conditions that
Congress evaluated when it passed those statutes.”175 Second, the
tariff statute at issue in Field required the President to make the
alterations upon finding that certain conditions existed, while under
the line item veto statute the determinations made by the President
do not require him to cancel or not to cancel a provision.176 Finally, the
President’s suspension of a tariff implemented congressional policy

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

See § 691(b), invalidated by Clinton, 524 U.S. 417.
§ 691(a)(3)(A), invalidated by Clinton, 524 U.S. 417.
§ 691(a)(3)(B), invalidated by Clinton, 524 U.S. 417.
Clinton, 524 U.S. at 438.
Id. at 439.
Id. at 439–40 (quoting I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983)).
143 U.S. 649, 696−97 (1892).
Clinton, 524 U.S. at 443.
Id. (citing Field, 143 U.S. at 686–87).
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while the cancellation under the Line Item Veto Act expressly
rejected the policy judgment made by Congress.177 The Court also
distinguished statutes involving discretionary spending authority on
the ground that the Line Item Veto Act gave the President “unilateral
power to change the text of duly enacted statutes.”178
Clinton has attracted many comments both praising and criticizing
the decision. The decision’s supporters argue that Clinton effectively
implements the non-delegation doctrine in a way that the Supreme
Court has never otherwise been prepared to do.179 Because the line
item veto permits Congress to evade responsibility for difficult budget
choices and leave that responsibility with the President, the Court’s
decision correctly rejected that innovation and placed the
responsibility back with Congress, where it belongs.180 Critics have
agreed with Justices Scalia, Breyer, and O’Connor that the Line Item
Veto Act did nothing more than delegate discretionary authority to
the President. Since the Line Item Veto Act did not involve an
attempt by Congress to increase its own authority it did not warrant
the restrictive formalist approach of Chadha. Instead, it granted the
President the power to control spending and thus gave the President
additional power to regulate an appropriate executive function.181
The analogy to Chadha is a useful one, but in support for the
decision rather than as a critique. The same reasons that warranted
the Court’s imposition of a procedural check on legislative authority
in Chadha also support the imposition of an analogous procedural
check on the President in Clinton. The purpose of the Bicameralism
and Presentment Clause is to ensure that basic decisions on matters of
177. Id.
178. Id. at 447. In dissent, Justice Scalia, joined by Justices O’Connor and Breyer, argued
that the “title of the Line Item Veto Act . . . has succeeded in faking out the Supreme Court.”
Id. at 469 (Scalia, J., dissenting). According to Justice Scalia, the executive action authorized by
the statute was not a line item veto, but simply an exercise of discretionary spending authorized
by statute and no different in effect from numerous other discretionary spending statutes
adopted by Congress in the past. Id.
179. See Michael B. Rappaport, The Selective Nondelegation Doctrine and the Line Item
Veto: A New Approach to the Nondelegation Doctrine and its Implications for Clinton v. City of
New York, 76 TUL. L. REV. 265, 366–67 (2001); Neal E. Devins, In Search of the Lost Chord:
Reflections on the 1996 Item Veto Act, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1605, 1629–31 (1997); Lawrence
Lessig, Lessons from a Line Item Veto Law, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1659, 1660–65 (1997);
Maxwell L. Stearns, The Public Choice Case Against the Item Veto, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
385, 436 (1992).
180. See Rappaport, id.; Stearns, id.
181. See generally Elizabeth Garrett, Accountability and Restraint: The Federal Budget
Process and The Line Item Veto Act, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 871 (1999); Saikrishna B. Prakash,
Deviant Executive Lawmaking, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1998).
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significant federal policies such as spending and taxation are made by
both houses and the President together so that all three remain
accountable for these actions and no one has the power to take
actions unchecked by the others. The procedural limitations thus
impose a significant restriction on the power of either branch to abuse
its authority and act arbitrarily.
It is insufficient to argue in response that Congress could have
granted discretionary authority to the President to spend all or part of
an appropriation based on an assessment of conditions arising after
the adoption of the statute. The President is allowed this delegated
discretion in order to respond to changing circumstances in a way
that, as head of the executive branch, he is much better able to
perform than Congress is. In exercising that power, it is, of course,
possible for the President to use “changed circumstances” as simply a
pretext for a decision that is in fact based upon his disagreement, ab
initio, with Congress’s decision to authorize any expenditure at all for
a particular subject, but there is simply no way to determine whether
that is what the President is doing.
In the case of the Line Item Veto Act, however, it is quite simple
to make that determination because the Act specified a limited time
period of only five days after enactment of the statute for the
President to cancel items of new spending or special tax provisions. In
this instance, it is simply not possible for circumstances to have
changed enough to warrant suspension of the expenditure or tax
provision, and the only possible basis for the President’s decision is
his disagreement with the judgment of the House and Senate that
these provisions were important enough to enact into law. Thus, the
Line Item Veto Act allowed the President to circumvent the
constitutional procedures requiring concurrence of House, Senate,
and President without the need to justify the departure based on
changed circumstances. Such an action clearly contravenes the entire
purpose of the Bicameralism and Presentment clause of the
Constitution, and it allows the President to take sole responsibility for
such spending and tax provisions.
It is, perhaps, surprising that Justice Scalia would not be receptive
to this argument since he made an analogous argument in opposing
the delegation of legislative authority to the Sentencing Commission
in his dissent in Mistretta v. United States.182 Justice Scalia argued
182. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 413 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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The whole theory of lawful congressional “delegation” is not that
Congress is sometimes too busy or too divided and can therefore
assign its responsibility of making law to someone else; but rather
that a certain degree of discretion and thus of lawmaking, inheres
in most executive or judicial action, and it is up to Congress, by the
relative specificity or generality of its statutory commands, to
determine—up to a point—how small or how large that decree
shall be.183

In the case of the Sentencing Commission, its delegated
lawmaking function was completely divorced from any responsibility
for execution of the law or adjudication of private rights under the
law. It is divorced from responsibility for the execution of the law “not
only because the Commission is not said to be ‘located in the
Executive Branch’ . . . but, more importantly, because the Commission
neither exercises any executive power on its own, nor is subject to the
control of the President who does.”184 Thus, Justice Scalia was arguing
that delegation is permissible because it is in large part
indistinguishable from the exercise of the executive power; when
divorced from its association with the executive power it becomes
simply a naked authorization to legislate—thus, in effect, making the
Sentencing Commission, in Scalia’s words, “a junior varsity
Congress.”185
A similar situation exists with respect to the Line Item Veto Act,
since delegation of discretionary spending and taxing authority is
authorized because it is necessary to allow the President to respond to
changed circumstances in an efficient manner. When divorced from
that justification by temporally limiting the President’s exercise of his
delegated power to the same week that the bill became law, the entire
justification for such delegations vanishes, and the delegated authority
becomes the naked power to change the bargain struck by the House,
Senate, and the President. This made the President even more than a
junior varsity member, since his decisions under the Line Item Veto
Act trumped the authority of the bicameral varsity Congress.
As a result, the Court’s decision in Clinton seems entirely justified
by both the letter and the spirit of the Bicameralism and the
Presentment Clauses. It ensures that the President will not be able to
alter the legislative bargain struck between himself and both Houses
183. Id. at 417.
184. Id. at 420.
185. Id. at 427.
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of Congress based solely on a substantive policy disagreement. This
decision is also consistent with the other decisions of the Supreme
Court imposing procedural checks on the exercise of power by the
federal courts and the Congress. Like Chadha, the decision in Clinton
v. New York cabins the authority of the President by imposing a
procedural mechanism to channel and restrain executive power and
prevent it from being exercised in an arbitrary and abusive manner. If
the President wishes to take an action the only purpose of which
could be to change the bargain struck between the House, the Senate,
and the President, the President must do so through the procedural
mechanisms specified by the Constitution: a veto of the entire bill and
not cancellation of individual parts of that bill in a way that creates an
entirely new bargain to which neither the House nor the Senate have
consented. Thus, Clinton is an appropriate example of the Court
adopting a procedural check to restrain the power of the President in
a manner similar to the procedural checks that are imposed on the
other branches.
3. Procedural Checks on the Executive’s Quasi-Judicial Power
As previously noted, the Supreme Court has recently taken a
permissive, functional approach to the assignment of quasi-judicial
power to the executive branch. However, one aspect of the Supreme
Court’s Article I court jurisprudence seems consistent with the cases
imposing procedural checks on the legislative and judicial branches.
The Supreme Court has stated that the validity of the assignment of
quasi-judicial power to the executive branch depends on “the extent
to which the ‘essential attributes of judicial power’ are reserved to
Article III courts.”186 This requirement places an important
procedural check on the exercise of quasi-judicial power by executive
branch agencies. To the extent that any executive branch adjudication
is subject to searching and thorough Article III judicial review, there
remains an important check upon the exercise of adjudicative
authority by the executive branch that protects against the potential
abuse of authority.
This procedural check not only protects the judicial branch and
ensures that it may continue to carry out its essential constitutional
functions, it also recognizes the significance of a procedural check like
the ones imposed on the judicial and legislative branches. Judicial

186. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851 (1986).
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review of the executive branch’s adjudicative actions is analogous to
the requirement that the President must have the option to review
legislation passed by both houses of Congress to determine whether
he wishes to exercise a veto. These procedural checks ensure that the
authority granted by the Constitution will not be abused, and
Congress should not be permitted to remove these checks through
legislative devices, regardless of the purported need.
III. CONGRESS’S POWER TO IMPOSE PROCEDURAL CHECKS ON THE
EXECUTIVE BRANCH
The procedural checks imposed by the Constitution on the
executive branch are admittedly limited. They apply to only certain
types of executive action, unlike the constitutionally required
procedural checks on the legislative and judicial branches. It is,
however, possible to find significant procedural checks on the
executive branch that channel executive power in such a way as to
prevent it from being abused or exercised in an arbitrary fashion.
Congress has the power to channel executive branch authority
through carefully wrought procedures, and it has done so with the
provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”)187 and
numerous other statutes such as the Freedom of Information Act,188
the Government in the Sunshine Act,189 and the Privacy Act,190 that
regulate how the executive branch exercises its substantive authority.
The Necessary and Proper Clause gives Congress the express
constitutional authority to establish procedural checks on the manner
in which the executive branch carries out authority delegated to it by
Congress.191 The Clause gives Congress the power to enact laws that
“shall be necessary and proper” to “carry into Execution” the powers
vested in the federal government.192 As John Manning has noted, the
“[C]lause is the one and only provision of the Constitution that
directly addresses the establishment of the federal government. It

187. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–59, 701–06, 1305, 3344, 6362, 7562
(2012).
188. Administrative Procedure Act § 552.
189. Administrative Procedure Act § 552b.
190. Administrative Procedure Act § 552a.
191. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 18 (“To make all Laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer
thereof.”).
192. Id.
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gives the relevant power expressly to Congress, but conditions its
exercise upon satisfaction of the requirement that any resulting law be
“necessary and proper” for carrying into execution the powers
granted by the Constitution.”193 Although formalists and
functionalists disagree on the extent to which the clause empowers
Congress to change the structure of the federal government,194 at the
very least, the clause gives Congress the power to mandate the
procedural safeguards that apply when the executive branch
implements a congressional statute.
Congress has stepped in to fill the void left by the absence of
procedural checks in Article II and has provided statutory guarantees
against the abuse of power by the executive branch. Congress has the
authority to impose the same kinds of procedural checks on the
exercise of power by the executive branch that the Court has applied
to the exercise of power by the courts and Congress, and Congress has
used that authority to adopt the APA and other statutes that channel
the exercise of executive power through specified procedural
mechanisms.195 For the purposes of this article, it is sufficient to focus
on the APA, which becomes the analog for the procedural checks
imposed on the judicial branch by the case or controversy
requirement and on the legislative branch by the Bicameralism and
Presentment Clauses.
When Congress adopted the APA, it imposed a set of procedural
requirements on both the administrative rulemaking process and the
administrative adjudication process.196 Section 553 requires that, with
specified exceptions, any binding rules issued by the executive branch
must be promulgated with “public notice of the proposed rule, receipt
and consideration of comments on the proposed rule on issuance of
the final rule incorporating the statement of basis and purpose.”197
The APA expressly authorizes courts to set aside agency rulemaking
actions if they are “arbitrary, capricious, in abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law.”198 Although agencies are
generally free to choose between adjudication and rulemaking as the

193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
(1971).

Manning, supra note 17, at 1951.
Id. at 1987–93.
5 U.S.C. §§ 551–59, 701–06, 1305, 3344, 6362, 7562.
See §§ 553, 554.
1 PIERCE, supra note 15.
§ 706(2)(A); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 414
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method of administrative policy making,199 most scholars support the
general practice of agencies in making policy through the rulemaking
process. Professor Richard Pierce notes that commentators have
identified at least nine different advantages of rulemaking over
adjudication as a source of generally applicable rules.200 Despite these
arguments, however, the Court has not yet shown any sign of
requiring agencies to utilize prospective rulemaking.
The APA imposes a number of different notice requirements on
agency rulemaking. First, the agency must provide notice of what it
proposes to do and the basis for its proposed actions.201 These
requirements are designed to provide any interested members of the
public with an opportunity to comment on the agency’s proposal. The
senate report on the APA stated that this “agency notice must be
sufficient to fairly apprise interested parties of the issues involved, so
that they may present responsive data or argument relating
thereto.”202 In addition to this preliminary notice, an agency must
publish “a substantive rule . . . not less than 30 days before its
effective date, except—(1) a substantive rule which grants or
recognizes an exemption or relieves a restriction; (2) interpretive rules
and statements of policy; or (3) as otherwise provided by the agency
for good cause found and published with the rule.”203 This
requirement allows members of the public sufficient time to prepare
for the implementation of the rule and insure that they will be in
compliance with the rule’s requirements.204 This thirty-day period is a
statutory minimum, and courts may require an agency to extend the
time to a substantially longer period.205
Finally, agencies must make all rules publicly available in order for
them to have a binding effect. The APA expressly requires each
agency to “publish in the Federal Register . . . rules of
procedure . . . substantive rules of general applicability . . . statements
of general policy or interpretations of general applicability . . . and . . .
199. See SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery II), 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947) (“[T]he choice made
between proceeding by general rule or by individual, ad hoc litigation is one that lies primarily
in the informed discretion of the administrative agency.”).
200. 1 PIERCE, supra note 15, at 368.
201. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b).
202. S. REP. NO. 79-248, at 200 (1946).
203. § 553(d).
204. 1 PIERCE, supra note 15, at 424.
205. See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n. Indep. Television Producers & Distribs. v. FCC, 502 F.2d 249,
254−55 (2d Cir. 1974) (holding that “the effective date of the new rule” is unreasonable because
it can cause “unnecessary expense”).
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each amendment, revision, or repeal of the foregoing.”206 The precise
scope of all of these notice requirements is unclear and has given rise
to much litigation,207 but, regardless of the exact scope of the
requirements, it is clear that they impose a significant check on
arbitrary agency behavior.
The APA also requires an agency “to incorporate in the rules
adopted a concise general statement of their basis and purpose.”208
The legislative history of this provision “suggests some duty to discuss
the factual basis for a rule and the reasoning process that links the
factual predicates to a set of expected effects consistent with one or
more statutory goals.”209 As the Senate committee stated in its report
on the APA, “the agency must analyze and consider all relevant
matter presented. The required statement of the basis and purposes of
rules issued should not only relate to the data so presented but with
reasonable fullness explain the actual basis and objectives of the
rule.”210
When agencies act through the rulemaking process, the courts
have interpreted these procedural requirements as mandating that
agencies articulate the basis for the policy choices they adopt. For
example, in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, the Court
reviewed a decision by the Secretary of Transportation to authorize
federal funding “for the construction of a six-lane interstate highway
through a public park in Memphis, Tennessee.”211 The Secretary did
not, however, issue a statement of his actual findings on “why he
believed there were no feasible and prudent alternative routes or why
design changes could not be made to reduce the harm to the park.”212
Those opposed to the highway argued that, without such formal
findings, the Secretary’s action was arbitrary and capricious under the
APA.213 The Supreme Court ruled that, even though the Secretary was
not required to make formal findings, the post-hoc affidavits
206. § 552(a)(1). See also 1 PIERCE, supra note 15, at 424.
207. See 1 PIERCE, supra note 15, at 426–41.
208. § 553(c).
209. Id.; 1 PIERCE, supra note 15, at 441.
210. S. DOC. NO. 248, 79th Cong. 201, 259 (1946).
211. 401 U.S. 402, 406 (1971).
212. Id. at 408.
213. Id. Both the Department of Transportation Act and the Federal-Aid Highway Act
provided that the Secretary “shall not approve any program or project” that requires the use of
any parkland “unless (1) there is no feasible and prudent alternative to the use of such land, and
(2) such program includes all possible planning to minimize harm to such park.” 23 U.S.C. § 138
(2012).
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describing the basis for the Secretary’s decision were inadequate and
that it was necessary to remand the case to the district court for
plenary review of the Secretary’s decision based on “the full
administrative record that was before the Secretary at the time he
made his decision.”214
Subsequently, the Supreme Court elaborated on the holding of
Overton Park by requiring an administrative explanation for notice
and comment rulemaking. In Motor Vehicle Manufacturer’s
Association v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,215 the
Court reviewed a National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
regulation that rescinded a prior rule requiring automobile
manufacturers to install a passive restraint system in all cars.216 The
Court held that an agency rule would be
arbitrary and capricious if the agency has relied on factors which
Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider
an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its
decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is
so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view
or the product of agency expertise.217

The Court then insisted that the agency itself must provide a reasoned
basis for its decision in that the “reviewing court should not attempt
itself to make up for such deficiencies; we may not supply a reasoned
basis for the agency’s action that the agency itself has not given.”218
Therefore, an agency “must examine the relevant data and articulate a
satisfactory explanation for its action including a rational connection
between the facts found and the choice made.”219 These cases
established a procedural regime under which the agencies must
explain the basis for their decision to adopt a particular rule.
This regime has been enforced with increasing vigor by the courts.
As Professor Richard Pierce has noted
No court today would uphold a major agency rule that
incorporates only a “concise general statement of basis and
purpose.” To have any reasonable prospect of obtaining judicial
affirmance of a major rule, an agency must set forth the basis and

214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 419–20.
463 U.S. 29 (1983).
Id. at 37–38.
Id. at 43.
Id.
Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962).

PETERSON ISSUE VERSION (DO NOT DELETE)

256

3/29/2018 1:48 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[VOL. 13:1

purpose of the rule in a detailed statement, often several hundred
pages long, in which the agency refers to the evidentiary basis for
all factual predicates, explains its method of reasoning from factual
predicates and the expected effects of the rule, relates the factual
predicates and expected effects of the rule to each of the statutory
goals or purposes the agency is required to further or to consider,
responds to all major criticisms contained in the comments on its
proposed rule, and explains why it has rejected at least some of the
most plausible alternatives to the rule it has adopted.220

A number of scholars have criticized the manner in which the
courts apply this highly specific and detailed requirement.221 First, it
clearly imposes a great demand on an administrative agency issuing
even a modest rule.222 In addition, some commentators have argued
that the test is applied in a manner that is strongly influenced by the
political or ideological leanings of the judges who review the agency
action.223 Finally, others have suggested the requirement as elaborated
by the courts goes beyond Congress’s intent in adopting the APA.224
Regardless of the criticisms, however, the Court is unlikely to
backtrack significantly on the imposition of a significant procedural
burden on an agency to explain the basis and purpose of a proposed
rule.
These procedural requirements impose a significant procedural
check on the executive branch, notwithstanding the increased
substantive deference that the Supreme Court has accorded agency
interpretations of statutes through Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council.225 Chevron (which has been cited in more
220. See 1 PIERCE, supra note 15, at 442. See also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of the
Judiciary in Implementing an Agency Theory of Government, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1239, 1263–65
(1989); Patricia Wald, The Contribution of the D.C. Circuit to Administrative Law, 40 ADMIN. L.
REV. 507, 528 (1988); Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Heightened Scrutiny of the Fourth
Branch: Separation of Powers and the Requirement of Adequate Reasons for Agency Decisions,
1987 DUKE L.J. 387, 422–25 (1987).
221. See 1 PIERCE, supra note 15, at 444.
222. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Inherent Limits on Judicial Control of Agency
Discretion: The D.C. Circuit and Nondelegation Doctrine, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 63, 94 (2000);
Stephen G. Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 393
(1986).
223. See Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83
VA. L. REV. 1717, 1729−32 (1997); Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Judicial Incentives and
Indeterminacy in Substantive Review of Administrative Decisions, 44 DUKE L.J. 1051, 1066–68
(1995).
224. See 1 PIERCE, supra note 15, at 445 (“The courts have replaced the statutory adjectives
‘concise’ and ‘general’ with the judicial adjectives ‘detailed’ and ‘encyclopedic.’”); Martin
Shapiro, APA: Past, Present, Future, 72 VA. L. REV. 447, 453–54 (1986).
225. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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cases than any other Supreme Court decision)226 involved a question
of the proper construction of the term “source” under the Clean Air
Act Amendments of 1977.227 There, the Court established a two-step
process to be used by courts in evaluating whether an agency properly
interpreted the statute it is charged with administering:
When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute it
administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the
question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise
question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end
of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect
to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however,
the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the
precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own
construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence
of administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute if silent or
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the
court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute.228

The Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) had redefined the
statutory term at issue in a way that made it less likely that a company
would be required to undergo the elaborate EPA review process. The
Supreme Court overturned the D.C. Circuit’s decision that the EPA
had inappropriately changed its interpretation of the statute. Because
the language and legislative history of the statute were unclear, the
definition of that term was a policy decision that should have been
left to the agency. The Court emphasized that judges “are not part of
either political branch of the Government.”229 The Court then went
on to note that
While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the
Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political
branch of the Government to make such policy choices – resolving
the competing interests which Congress itself either inadvertently
did not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by the agency
charged with the administration of the statute in light of everyday
realities.230

Thus, the Court left to agencies the responsibility of resolving

226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

See 1 PIERCE, supra note 15, at 140.
Pub. L. No. 95–95, 91 Stat. 685.
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 865.
Id. at 865–66.
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ambiguous questions of statutory construction. As a result, the courts
are now required to give much more substantive discretion to an
agency’s interpretation of the statute it administers, but the
procedural checks imposed by the APA remain in place to be
enforced by the courts.
When taken together, these requirements imposed by Congress
and the courts create a set of procedural checks on the exercise of
executive power that look remarkably similar to the procedural
checks that the Constitution imposes on the courts and Congress. Just
as the case or controversy requirement and the Bicameralism and
Presentment Clause direct the exercise of judicial and legislative
power through a “carefully wrought set of procedures,” so too does
the APA direct the exercise of executive rulemaking authority
through a similar set of procedures designed to limit arbitrariness and
curb the potential for abuse of authority. Similarly, just as the case or
controversy requirement and the Bicameralism and Presentment
Clause leave the courts and Congress free to make whatever
substantive judgments they believe to be correct in deciding cases or
adopting legislation, so do the APA and the Supreme Court’s Chevron
doctrine leave the executive branch substantial room to make
substantive policy judgments within the limitations imposed by
Congress. The hole left by the absence of any significant constitutional
limitations on the procedures by which the executive branch exercises
its constitutional functions has been filled by Congress, which
successfully created a detailed set of procedures to restrain the
exercise of discretion by the executive branch.
Thus, through the enactment of the APA, Congress has redressed
the imbalance created by the Supreme Court’s cases concerning the
ability of Congress to augment statutorily the powers of the respective
branches. Congress has matched the Court’s strict imposition of
procedural checks on the courts and Congress. As a result, executive
authority is constrained in a precisely analogous manner to the way in
which the Court has restrained the exercise of judicial and legislative
authority.
One might ask, however, whether the legislative imposition of
procedural checks under the APA is the equivalent of constitutional
doctrines regulating the exercise of judicial and legislative authority.
After all, notwithstanding the statutory checks created by the APA,
the executive branch is still unbound by significant constitutional
checks on the exercise of its delegated authority. Congress remains
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free to unbind the executive branch in a manner that would be
impermissible with respect to either the judicial or legislative
branches. As a practical matter, however, this seems like an
insignificant risk. We might well worry about the potential for abuse
of authority if Congress were given constitutional freedom to
augment its own power to act other than through the bicameralism
and presentment process. Congress clearly has an incentive to expand
its own powers and avoid the procedural checks imposed by
bicameralism and presentment. Conversely, however, Congress has
little of the same incentive to withdraw the procedural checks
imposed by the APA on the executive branch. Although Congress
may have some incentive to pass the buck by delegating difficult
policy choices to the executive branch, it has good reason to retain the
checks imposed by the APA, which help to legitimate executive
branch lawmaking.
IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF CONGRESS’S POWER TO IMPOSE
PROCEDURAL CHECKS ON THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH
Congress’s power to redress the constitutional asymmetry with
respect to the procedural checks on the power of the branches has a
number of normative implications for some major issues of statutory
and constitutional interpretation. First, it means that both scholars
and the courts should be sensitive to the role of the APA as an
executive-branch analogue to the case or controversy and
bicameralism and presentment requirements. Although early theories
of the administrative state focused on the need to enforce procedures
to limit the arbitrariness of executive-branch decision-making, later
scholarship has focused on the importance of executive accountability
in legitimating the administrative decision-making process.231 Under
this approach, ensuring that the President is held politically
accountable for agency action should be sufficient to prevent the
executive branch from abusing its authority. Accountability alone,
however, is insufficient to legitimate the administrative state; the
courts must interpret the APA so as to prevent the arbitrary exercise
of delegated executive authority.232 Understanding the importance of

231. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the
Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461 (2003).
232. See id.; Lisa Schultz Bressman, Disciplining Delegation After Whitman v. American
Trucking Ass’n., 87 CORNELL L. REV. 452 (2002); Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114
HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001).
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the APA as an executive-branch analogue to the constitutionally
imposed procedural checks on the arbitrary exercise of judicial and
congressional power supports this approach to administrative law and
suggests that the courts should be aggressive about ensuring that
administrative agencies comply with the procedures designed to
protect against arbitrariness.
Second, Congress’s power to impose procedural checks on the
executive branch means that, as a practical matter, we need not worry
about the apparent asymmetry of cases restricting the power of
Congress to expand the powers of the branches. It may be true that
the Court has, in effect, read the Constitution to impose
comprehensive procedural checks on the courts and Congress while
leaving the executive branch, with limited exceptions, unrestricted by
similar procedural checks. Nevertheless, Congress’s power to fill the
gap left by the Supreme Court and impose a congruent set of
procedural checks on the exercise of power delegated to the executive
branch more than adequately addresses any worries about the
constitutional asymmetry. These checks operate to constrain the
arbitrary exercise of authority by the executive branch in essentially
the same way that the case or controversy limitations check the
federal courts and the Bicameralism and Presentment Clause check
the Congress.
Moreover, where the Constitution may be read to impose limited
procedural checks on the executive branch, as in the case of the line
item veto, the Court has stepped in to prevent any effort to
circumvent those procedural checks. As a result, the asymmetry of
procedural checks is more apparent than real. Each of the branches is
now required to exercise its authority in accordance with procedures
designed to avoid abuses of its authority. The executive branch, no less
than Congress and the courts, must live within clear procedural
guidelines when exercising its authority under the Constitution and
statutes.
Thus, the critics of the Supreme Court’s separation of powers
jurisprudence233 have exaggerated the arguments against cases like
Chadha, Bowsher, and Buckley. There is no need to abandon the
procedural checks on Congress and the courts in order to allow those
branches to recapture authority from the executive branch or redress
an imbalance in the separation of powers. Congress has delegated
233. See Elliott, supra note 7; Strauss, supra note 7.
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substantial regulatory authority to the executive branch, but that
authority must be exercised in accordance with procedural checks that
accomplish the same objective as the procedural checks imposed by
the Constitution on Congress and the courts. Congress itself has
redressed the apparent imbalance, and it is unlikely ever to abandon
these congressionally imposed procedural checks.
Third, the importance of congressionally imposed procedural
checks in redressing the asymmetry of constitutionally imposed
checks on the branches has important implications for issues involving
the constitutionality of statutes that purport to specify the procedures
that must be followed by the executive branch. Because the legitimacy
of the constitutionally imposed procedural checks on the courts and
Congress depends on the power of Congress to impose analogous
checks on the executive branch, Congress must be given wide latitude
to determine what are the most appropriate and effective ways in
which to regulate the procedures used to implement the power
delegated to the executive branch.
This conclusion calls into question the broad claims of those who
advocate a unitary executive theory that rejects the legitimacy of
congressionally imposed checks on how the President exercises
executive power.234 In particular, it undermines the extreme form of
the unitary executive theory adopted by the George W. Bush
administration. As noted earlier, the Bush administration routinely
issued signing statements in which the President asserted that
procedural requirements imposed by a newly enacted statute were
inconsistent with the President’s powers under Article II.235 The
President’s claims of immunity from the congressional imposition of
procedural checks on his delegated power are inconsistent with the
broad congressional authority that is necessary to redress the
asymmetry of constitutionally imposed procedural checks on the
powers of the branches. Congress has power under the Necessary and
Proper Clause to regulate how the executive branch performs the
functions delegated by statute to the executive branch. Without that
authority, Congress would be unable to impose the procedural checks
234. See, e.g., Christopher S. Yoo, Steven G. Calabresi & Anthony J. Colangelo, The
Unitary Executive in the Modern Era, 1945-2004, 90 IOWA L. REV. 604 (2005) (Scholarly debate
has focused on whether the Constitution created a ‘unitary executive’ in which all executive
authority is centralized in the President, rather than the ‘executive by committee’ that existed
under the Articles of Confederation.”).
235. See generally SAVAGE, supra note 50; Biller, supra note 50; Shane, supra note 50;
Kinkopf, supra note 50.
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that are necessary to prevent the arbitrary exercise of executive
authority.
CONCLUSION
The conceptual muddle created by the Supreme Court’s
separation of powers cases can be substantially simplified by
reconceptualizing the limitations imposed on Congress’s power to
augment the inherent powers of the three branches. In cases involving
the expansion of the authority of the federal courts, the case or
controversy requirement contained in Article III, Section 2, of the
Constitution imposes a procedural check on the form in which the
federal courts exercise their constitutional authority. Congress may
not circumvent these checks by statutorily granting the courts the
power to act substantively other than in the context of a genuine case
or controversy.
A similar procedural check governs many of the cases dealing
with the statutes augmenting Congress’s authority. Although the
reasoning of the Court’s decisions may not expressly identify this
procedural check, the effect of the Chadha, Bowsher, and Washington
Metropolitan Airport Authority decisions is to ensure that Congress
cannot act substantively to affect the rights of anyone outside the
legislative branch other than through the procedures set forth in the
Bicameralism and Presentment Clause of the Constitution. These
constitutionally imposed procedural checks on the exercise of judicial
and legislative power provide significant safeguards against the abuse
or arbitrary exercise of those powers.
The Constitution does not, however, provide an analogous
comprehensive procedural check on the power exercised by the
executive branch. As a result, many scholars worry that the Court’s
separation of powers jurisprudence is dangerously imbalanced. They
argue that the procedural checks imposed on Congress in cases like
Chadha and Bowsher are shortsighted because they ignore the need
for Congress to readjust the balance of power, tipped too far toward
the executive branch, as a result of the massive delegations of
authority to the President and his subordinates in the executive
branch. For these scholars, the formalistic limitations of Chadha and
Bowsher and Washington Metropolitan Airport Authority ignore the
realities of the modern administrative state and exacerbate the shift of
power in favor of the executive branch.
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For a number of reasons, however, this apparent asymmetry
should not cause us great concern. First, the Supreme Court has
recognized constitutionally imposed procedural checks that apply to
at least some areas of executive power. These checks include the Due
Process requirements that apply with respect to certain vested
government entitlements, the restrictions on the line item veto and
the need for Article III judicial review of the decisions of Article I
courts in the executive branch.
Second, and more importantly, Congress has stepped in to fill the
void left by the Constitution by statutorily imposing procedural
checks on the exercise of executive power that are analogous to the
constitutionally imposed procedural checks on the federal courts and
Congress. The requirements of the APA and similar statutes channel
the exercise of executive power through a set of procedures that
protect against the arbitrary and abusive exercise of delegated power.
As a result, these statutes comprehensively redress the imbalance of
constitutionally imposed procedural checks and protect against the
abuse of power by the executive branch.
The normative significance of these conclusions is three-fold. First,
the conclusions lend support to those who argue for an interpretation
of the APA that enhances the protection against arbitrary decisionmaking. Second, the scholarly critiques of cases like Chadha and
Bowsher no longer carry much weight. Instead, these cases become
part of a set of constitutional and administrative law principles that
protect against the arbitrary exercise of governmental power through
the imposition of procedural checks on the exercise of all
governmental authority. Finally, the constitutional importance of
Congress’s power to impose procedural checks on the executive
branch blunts the force of those who argue for a strong unitary
executive theory that would preclude Congress from regulation
executive branch functions.

